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Arthur v. Catour: An Examination of the
Collateral Source Rule in Illinois
Robert Hernquist*
I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of tort reform has received much attention in recent years,
from both the legal community and the nation as a whole.1 Illinois, in
particular, has received sharp criticism from those calling for limits on
recoveries. 2  Critics decry pro-plaintiff sentiment for causing corpora-
tions and medical providers to flee Illinois. 3 A 2004 poll of businesses
ranked Illinois as the forty-sixth fairest state to defendants in litigation,
while three Illinois counties were ranked among the fifteen jurisdictions
in the country most unfair to defendants. 4 In a 2005 report, the Ameri-
can Medical Association included Illinois on its list of seventeen crisis
states, based on the volume and dollar amount of filed lawsuits.
5
J.D., Loyola University Chicago, expected May 2007. I would like to thank the editorial board
and members of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal whose comments and suggestions
have significantly improved the quality of this Note, and Ehsan Eftekhari for suggesting this case
as a topic. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the following attorneys who were
involved in the Arthur v. Catour case and were kind enough to furnish me with copies of their
motions and memoranda: LeRoy A. Compton, Peter A. Monahan, Michael T. Reagan, and
Heather G. Rouleau.
1. In 2005, President Bush chose Madison County as the location for the start of his campaign
for federal tort reform. George Bush Visits Physicians in Madison County, IL, CHICAGO
MEDICAL SOCIETY, http://www.cmsdocs.org/content/index.pl?iid=2725&isa=Category (last
visited September 25, 2006) (reporting on the President's visit and stating that "[1]egal industry
critics have ranked Madison County as America's worst 'judicial hellhole' for lawsuits and class
action suits").
2. HUMPHREY TAYLOR ET AL., 2005 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE STATE LIABILITY
SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY 45 (2005), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.org/
harris/pdf/harrispol12005-fullreport.pdf.
3. See generally id.
4. Id. at 17, 45. The three Illinois counties receiving this dubious distinction were Cook,
Madison, and St. Clair. Id. at 17.
5. American Medical Association Medical Liability Crisis Map, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/noindex/category/I 1871 .html (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
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However, in 2003 Illinois ranked only thirty-second in a list of states
having the most paid claims per 1,000 physicians. 6 In fact, reports from
the defense bar's own lobbyists reveal that medical malpractice verdicts
in Cook County actually decreased from 2000 through 2004.7
The plaintiffs' bar and consumer watchdogs respond that the
insurance companies deserve the blame for this perceived litigation
crisis. 8 In 2003, Illinois life and health insurers reported total earnings
of more than $1.6 billion for the first three quarters, up from $236
million the previous year. 9 Nationally, life and health insurers posted
total earnings of $18.1 billion for the first three quarters of 2003, a more
than fivefold increase from $3.3 billion the prior year.10 Nationwide,
profits for property-casualty insurers also soared. 11
In Arthur v. Catour, the Illinois Supreme Court decided a widely
debated issue that has been a concern on both sides of the tort-reform
struggle. 12 The case involved the question of whether an injured party
may recover damages for medical bills that were later discounted by the
health care provider, or if the plaintiff's recovery is limited to the
amount actually accepted as payment in full. 13 Medical discounts have
become widespread in modem health care, as the strength of both
private and government-supported health care providers has increased. 14
6. Berkley Rice, Malpractice: Where Does Your State Rank?, MED. ECON., Oct. 7, 2005,
available at http://www.memag.com/memag/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=182789&&pageID=l.
7. Mark Deaton, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, The Illinois Hospital
Association Supports a Reasonable Range for Awarding Non-economic Damages, (April 7,
2005), http://www.ihatoday.org/issues/liability/talk/testdeaton.pdf. In 2000, jury verdicts
awarded in medical malpractice cases totaled $212,000,000, whereas in 2004 that value was
$157,200,000. Id.
8. Letter from J. Robert Hunter, Dir. of Ins. of the Consumer Fed'n of Ins., Birny Birnbaum,
Executive Dir. of the Ctr. for Econ. Justice, to Ins. Comm'r 50 States and the District of
Columbia, at 1 (May 11, 2004), available at http://www.insurance-reform.org/AIRIns
Comm 04.pdf [hereinafter Letter to Insurance Commissioners] (labeling prevailing rates as
..price gouging" in arguing for insurance reform). The author reports that after an Illinois medical
malpractice insurer reported a $20 million profit the company's senior executives responded by
giving themselves 12-18% raises in salary and raised premiums by 35%. Id. at 3.
9. Insurers Profits Fall in Missouri, Rise in Illinois, ST. LOUIS BUS. J., Mar. 29, 2004,
available at http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/2004/03/29/dailyl4.html.
10. Id.
11. Letter to Insurance Commissioners, supra note 8, at 3 (reporting that the five largest
national insurers reported Returns on Equity ranging from 12.5 to 17.4%, due in large part to
falling "loss ratios"). Profits for 2003 were $29.9 billion, almost ten times the $3 billion reported
in 2002. Id.
12. Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 849 (111. 2005) (holding that plaintiffs may present to a
jury amounts originally billed for health care, even when those amounts are discounted by the
health care provider pursuant to a contract with the plaintiffs health insurer).
13. Id.
14. Michael K. Beard, The Impact of Changes in Health Care Provider Reimbursement
The Collateral Source Rule in Illinois
As these discounts have become more common, courts across the
country have been forced to address this debate. 15 A majority of states
permit a plaintiff to recover the amount billed for medical expenses, and
do not limit recovery to the amount actually paid. 16 Although the
Illinois Supreme Court adopted the majority view in Arthur, the court
left a number of questions unanswered and failed to address several
conflicts arising from prior rulings.17
This Note reviews the recent Arthur opinion in light of the inherent
conflicts between the collateral source rule18 and Illinois policy for
awarding compensatory damages. 19 Part II of this Note provides back-
ground on compensatory damages and the collateral source rule, the
recent trend of discounting medical services, and Illinois's adoption of
and limitations upon the collateral source rule.20  Part III discusses the
Arthur case from its commencement in the trial court through the
Illinois Supreme Court's decision.21 Part IV analyzes the case, showing
that the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the preferable rule but failed to
provide guidelines on how the holding should be applied in practice.
This Part also discusses the court's refusal to address discrepancies and
conflicts arising from earlier opinions that limited the collateral source
rule in Illinois.22 Finally, Part V predicts how the Arthur holding will
change trial practice in Illinois.23
Systems on the Recovery of Damages for Medical Expenses in Personal Injury Suits, 21 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 453, 463-66 (1998). The Beard article has been cited by an Illinois court when
addressing the issue of medical discounts. See, e.g, Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 854 (citing Beard as
support for the court's review of medical discounts).
15. Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 863 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 863 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting).
17. See id. at 856-59 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion fails to
address a number of conflicts and unanswered questions).
18. The collateral source rule provides that if an injured party receives compensation from a
third party (the collateral source), the amount of that compensation will not be deducted from the
damages that must be paid by the tortfeasor. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 256 (8th ed. 2004).
19. Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 858 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting).
20. See infra Part II (outlining the development of the collateral source rule, the modem trend
of discounted health care, and the adoption and limitations of the collateral source rule in Illinois).
21. See infra Part Ell (providing an account of the developments in Arthur v. Catour).
22. See infra Part IV (arguing that the Illinois Supreme Court's holding is correct, but the
court's refusal to address all issues presented in the case will likely cause confusion and future
litigation).
23. See infra Part V (examining the possible implications that the Arthur opinion will have on
trial practice in Illinois).
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II. BACKGROUND
Although the collateral source rule has developed into a firmly
entrenched principle of tort law, the doctrine has been attacked by
critics and limited by state legislatures. 24 The collateral source rule has
received renewed attention in recent years because of the rule's impact
and effect upon awards of damages. 25 This Part provides a basic
overview of compensatory damages, followed by a description of how
the collateral source rule operates. 26 Next, this Part presents a history of
the common law collateral source rule27 and the historic arguments for
and against the rule.28 This Part then reviews the recent trend of
discounted medical services in the modem health care industry,29 and
discusses the methods that courts outside of Illinois use when
confronted with damage claims for amounts that have been discounted
by health care providers. 30 Finally, this Part describes the evolution of
the collateral source rule in Illinois, particularly the restrictions that
have been placed on the doctrine. 31
A. Compensatory Tort Damages
Compensatory damages attempt to restore the injured party as close
as possible to the position he would have been in had the tort not
occurred.32 It is these compensatory damages that are affected by the
collateral source rule. 33 A discussion of the collateral source rule in
Illinois is best understood by first reviewing Illinois's evidentiary rules
and policies regarding medical damages. 34 This Section will first
24. See infra Parts Il.B.2-B.4 (discussing the development of the rule, the rationale behind the
rule, and limitations on the rule).
25. See infra Parts 11.B.3-B.4 (discussing the rationale behind the rule and limitations on the
rule).
26. See infra Part ll.B.1 (explaining the purpose and operation of the collateral source rule).
27. See infra Part II.B.2 (tracing the early development and adoption of the collateral source
rule in the United States).
28. See infra Parts II.B.3-B.4 (reviewing popular judicial and academic arguments for and
against the collateral source rule).
29. See infra Parts I.B.3-B.4 (reviewing popular judicial and academic arguments for and
against the collateral source rule).
30. See infra Part II.C (reviewing the recent development of health care as an industry, and the
modern trend of granting discounts to insurers in exchange for a steady supply of clients).
31. See infra Part II.D (reviewing the adoption and development of the collateral source rule
in Illinois, as well as judicial restrictions placed on it).
32. United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958).
33. Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Ill. 2005) (citing J. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING
REMEDIES § 12(a), at 77 (1999)).
34. See id. at 856-59 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting) (discussing Illinois's evidentiary rules and
policies regarding compensatory damages in medical cases).
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present the purpose, goal, and policy reasons for awarding compensa-
tory damages in Illinois. 35 It then provides the evidentiary rules for
establishing compensatory damages in Illinois.36
The goal of compensatory damages is to make an injured plaintiff
whole, 37 by attempting to place him in the position he would have been
in had the tort never occurred.38 Plaintiffs are entitled to recover as
compensatory damages their reasonable expenses for necessary medical
care, treatment, and services. 39 Illinois courts have explicitly stated that
compensatory damages are not intended to punish the tortfeasor or
bestow a windfall upon the plaintiff.40 Furthermore, Illinois courts
condemn double recovery,4 1 and have held that a plaintiff shall have
only one recovery for an injury. 42
In order to recover medical expenses in Illinois, the injured party
must first prove that he has made a payment or that he is liable to pay a
specific amount and, second, that the charges are reasonable for services
of that nature.43 A paid bill is prima facie evidence of reasonableness, 44
because it is assumed that voluntary payment of the amount implies its
reasonableness. 45 This rule also promotes efficient judicial administra-
35. See infra Part II.A (discussing the purpose and policy reasons for awarding compensatory
damages in Illinois).
36. See infra Part II.A (explaining Illinois evidentiary rules for establishing reasonableness of
medical bills in tort actions).
37. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1076 (111. 1997) (stating that "[t]here is
universal agreement that the compensatory goal of tort law requires that an injured plaintiff be
made whole.").
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1979). "[C]ompensatory damages are
designed to place him in a position substantially equivalent in a pecuniary way to that which he
would have occupied had no tort been committed." Id.
39. 3-112 ILLINOIS FORMS OF JURY INSTRUCTION § 112.01 (2005).
40. Wilson v. Hoffman Group, 546 N.E.2d 524, 530 (I1. 1989). Because such damages are
intended to compensate, rather than punish, they are labeled as "compensatory damages." Id.
Damages awarded in order to punish a defendant are called "punitive damages." Mattyasovsky v.
West Towns Bus Co., 330 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ill. 1975).
41. Popovich v. Ram Pipe & Supply Co., 412 N.E.2d 518, 521 (Ill. 1980) (citing policy
concerns against double recoveries for tort injuries).
42. Dial v. City of O'Fallon, 411 N.E.2d 217, 222 (Ill. 1980) (stating that Illinois courts "have
long recognized the legal principle that a plaintiff shall have only one satisfaction for an injury
irrespective of the availability of multiple theories that recovery for the injury can be sought
under.").
43. Barreto v. City of Waukegan, 478 N.E.2d 581, 589 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (providing the
rules for establishing reasonableness of medical bills).
44. Wicks v. Cuneo-Henneberry Co., 150 N.E. 276, 278 (111. 1925). See also M. GRAHAM,
CLEARY & GRAHAM'S HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 803.22 (8th ed. 2004) (explaining
the evidentiary rules for introducing medical bills in Illinois).
45. See Lanquist v. City of Chicago, 65 N.E. 681, 683 (111. 1902) (stating that reasonableness
of value may be shown by sales "made in a free and open market, and where a fair opportunity
for competition exists"); see also Cloyes v. Plaatje, 231 Ill. App. 183, 192-93 (App. Ct. 1923)
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tion by eliminating the need for numerous witnesses to establish that the
billed amounts are reasonable. 46  However, evidence of the amount
charged, by itself, will not establish reasonableness. 47 For unpaid medi-
cal bills, a plaintiff must establish reasonableness by other means, usu-
ally through the testimony of a witness from the medical community.
48
B. The Collateral Source Rule
The collateral source rule prevents damage awards from being
reduced when a plaintiff has received compensation from a third party,
and it also serves to prevent the jury from learning of those third-party
payments. 49  Although the injured party may have received benefits
such as insurance payments or worker's compensation, those amounts
will not be deducted from the damage award, and the jury may not learn
of such payments. 50 At first blush, the operation of the collateral source
rule appears to allow an injured party to collect twice for his injury-
once from the third party, and then again from the tortfeasor.5 1  This
perceived "double recovery" has resulted in criticism of the doctrine by
both courts and academics. 52  This Section will first explain the
operation of the collateral source rule and how it interacts with damages
principles. 53  It then traces the history of the rule and common law
restrictions that have developed since its inception. 54  Finally, the
arguments developed by courts and academics in favor and in criticism
of the collateral source rule are presented.55
(holding that the price paid to satisfy a bill is presumptive evidence of the reasonable value of the
services).
46. Flynn v. Cusentino, 375 N.E.2d 433, 436 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (explaining that the
'rationale for the rule is the desire to eliminate unnecessary cost to the parties and inconvenience
to the public by having to call multiple witnesses").
47. Cooper v. Cox, 175 N.E.2d 651, 655 (111. App. Ct. 1961) (finding reversible error where
an unpaid medical bill was admitted without any further evidence establishing that the amount
charged was reasonable).
48. Victory Mem'l Hosp. v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d 117, 119 (ill. App. Ct. 1986) (explaining that a
witness must testify that he is familiar with the usual and customary charges for the services
rendered to the patient and that the charges were reasonable).
49. Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 852 (111. 2005).
50. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 38, at § 901(A).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS, supra note 38, at § 901(A).
52. See infra Part Il.B.4 (explaining criticisms of the collateral source rule).
53. See infra Part ll.B.1 (explaining the purpose and operation of the collateral source rule).
54. See infra Part II.B.2 (tracing the early development and adoption of the collateral source
rule in the United States).
55. See infra Parts 11.B.3-B.4 (reviewing popular judicial and academic arguments for and
against the collateral source rule).
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1. Operation of the Collateral Source Rule
The collateral source rule is an exception to the general rule of
damages preventing a double recovery by an injured party.56 The rule
prevents benefits received by a plaintiff from independent sources from
diminishing recoverable damages. 57  Under the collateral source doc-
trine, an injured party who receives benefits from a collateral source
may still recover full damages from the party who caused the injury.58
Theoretically, a plaintiff may recover twice for a single injury--once
from the defendant and once from the collateral source (usually insur-
ance). 59  Typically, however, the collateral source will have a lien or
subrogation right, which prevents a double recovery. 60
The collateral source rule operates as both a rule of damages and a
rule of evidence. 61 As to damages, the rule prevents any reduction of a
plaintiff's recovery due to amounts received from third parties, which
are "collateral" from the tortfeasor. 62 As a rule of evidence, it prevents
juries from learning anything about collateral income that could affect
their assessment of damages.63
56. Muranyi v. Turn Verein Frisch-Au, 719 N.E.2d 366, 369 (111. App. Ct. 1999) (explaining
that under the collateral source rule a "plaintiff may recover twice for a single injury--once from
the defendant and once from the collateral source. This result leaves the rule open to the criticism
that it bestows a windfall on plaintiffs, violating the principle that the purpose of tort damages is
simply to make plaintiffs whole.").
57. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 18, at 256 (defining the collateral source rule as
"[t]he doctrine that if an injured party receives compensation for the injuries from a source
independent of the tortfeasor, the payment should not be deducted from the damages that the
tortfeasor must pay.").
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 38, at § 920A(1). However, if a
defendant makes any payment toward the plaintiffs liabilities, that amount would have the effect
of limiting the defendant's liability. Id. § 920A cmt. a. For example, if a defendant pays the
plaintiff's hospital bills, or if a defendant employer pays a plaintiffs insurance premiums, those
payments are not collateral and would be used to mitigate any award of damages to the plaintiff.
Id.
59. See id. § 920A(2). In addition to insurance, other possible collateral sources include
employment benefits, gratuities, and social legislation benefits. Id. § 920A cmt. c.
60. Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 630 N.W.2d 201, 210 (Wis. 2001). "Subrogation exists to ensure
that the loss is ultimately placed upon the wrongdoer and to prevent the subrogor from being
unjustly enriched through a double recovery, i.e., a recovery from the subrogated party and the
liable third party." Id. at 211. Subrogation means that the insurer is substituted for the insured in
regard to a right the insured has to receive compensation from another source. JOHN APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE, § 3.1 (Supp. 2005). An insurer asserting a subrogation right is
viewed as "standing in the shoes" of the insured and is entitled to receive reimbursement for
expenditures previously made on behalf of the insured. Id.
61. Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 852 (I1. 2005) (citing J. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING
REMEDIES § 12(a), at 77 (1999)).
62. Id.
63. Id. This protection is in addition to the common evidence rule barring evidence that any
party had insurance. Guardado v. Navarro, 197 N.E.2d 469, 474 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964).
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2. Development of the Collateral Source Rule
The collateral source rule originated in England during the 1820s
6 4
and was first accepted in the United States in 1854.65 In The Propeller
Monticello v. Mollison, a maritime case, the United States Supreme
Court adopted the English rule in holding that insurance benefits could
not be used to reduce an award of damages. 66  Referring to the
insurance policy as "a wager between third parties," the Court ruled that
because the insurer was not a joint tortfeasor, the liability of the
defendant "could not be offset by the insurance policy."67
New York implemented the doctrine in 1860, refusing to deduct life
insurance proceeds from a widow's wrongful death recovery. 68 The
Vermont Supreme Court gave the doctrine its current name in 1871,
when it described a plaintiffs accident insurance benefits as being
"collateral. '69 Since then, the collateral source rule has become a
fixture in American common law, adopted to some degree in every
state.70 Jurisdictions vary widely in their application of the rule-some
64. THOMAS MOORE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 5:2.1 (7th ed. Supp. 2005) (stating that
English courts adopted the rule in 1823); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra
note 38, at § 920A cmt. d (explaining that "the collateral source rule is of common law origin").
65. Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARv. L. REV.
741, 741 n.3 (1964) [hereinafter Unreason] (citing The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison as the
first American case recognizing the collateral source rule). See also Richard C. Maxwell, The
Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L. REV. 669 (1962) (also
recognizing The Propeller Monticello as the first American case recognizing the collateral source
rule).
66. The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. 152, 155 (1854). This case involved a
nighttime collision between a steamboat and a schooner on Lake Huron, causing the schooner to
sink. Id. at 153. Writing that "[t]he insurer does not stand in the relation of a joint trespasser, so
that satisfaction accepted from him shall be a release of others," the Court held a wrongdoer
cannot be allowed to use the equities between an insurer and insured as a defense. Id. at 155.
67. Id. The court added that regardless of any insurance benefits received by the plaintiff, a
defendant "is bound to make satisfaction for the injury he has done." Id.
68. Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N.Y. 355, 358 (1860). In Althorf, the decedent was a pedestrian who
was killed when struck in the head by snow and ice thrown from the roof of the defendant's
house. Id. at 359. The court upheld the trial court, which had refused a jury instruction offered
by the defendant that requested an offset in damages for any life insurance benefits received by
the widow. Id. at 358.
69. Harding v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 536, 538 (1870). The Vermont court held there is
no reason to allow insurance benefits received by a plaintiff to be used as a defense or offset of
damages by the defendant, because there is no legal privity between the defendant and insurer,
and the insurer is not a joint tortfeasor. Id. The insurance was acquired solely by the plaintiff, at
his own expense, and for his own benefit, rather than for the benefit of the defendant, and it
would be inappropriate to allow a defendant to benefit from such a policy. Id.
70. John L. Antracoli, Note, California's Collateral Source Rule and Plaintiffs Receipt of
Uninsured Motorist Benefits, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 667, 667 n.5 (1986) (detailing the widespread
acceptance of the collateral source rule by American courts). Alabama was the last state to adopt
the collateral source rule, finally recognizing the doctrine in 1977. Id. (citing Gribble v. Cox, 349
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allow plaintiffs to recover for the value of services, even when the
services were rendered free of charge.71  Other jurisdictions have
attempted to limit the doctrine, through statutory and judicial
restraints.
Soon after the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the collateral source
rule, and only a few years after Vermont named it, state courts began to
find exceptions to the doctrine. In 1880, a New York case held the
collateral source rule to be inapplicable when medical services are
provided gratuitously. 73  Soon thereafter, Pennsylvania also recognized
this exception, forbidding use of the collateral source rule as a method
to recover for gratuitous services.74  Today in some jurisdictions there
can be no recovery for medical services unless money has actually been
paid or liability has been incurred.75 Another common restriction is that
a plaintiff usually may not recover medical bills that were discharged in
bankruptcy. 76
So. 2d 1141 (Ala. 1977)).
71 See James L. Branton, Symposium: Developments in Tort Law and Tort Reform-The
Collateral Source Rule, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 883, 886 (1987) (describing what has been termed a
"pure" collateral source rule). See also Oil Country Haulers, Inc. v. Griffin, 668 S.W.2d 903, 904
(Tex. App. 1981) (ruling that gratuitous medical bills are recoverable from a tortfeasor); Texas
Power & Light v. Jacobs, 323 S.W.2d 483, 494-95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (holding that medical
services provided gratuitously through a veteran's program were recoverable as damages).
72. Branton, supra note 71, at 888-89 (describing statutory and judicial limits that have been
placed on the doctrine, such as lirniting or abolishing the rule for medical malpractice cases or
cases where the government is a defendant); Antracoli, supra note 70, at 678 (discussing
exceptions and limits to the collateral source rule in California, such as abolishing its applicability
to medical malpractice actions).
73. Drinkwater v. Dinsmore, 80 N.Y. 390, 393 (1880) (holding that a plaintiff could not
recover damages for nursing expenses because the services were provided gratuitously by a
religious foundation). See also Morris v. Grand Ave. Ry. Co., 46 S.W. 170, 172 (Mo. 1898)
(holding a plaintiff could not recover for gratuitous services).
74. Walker v. City of Phila., 45 A. 657, 658 (Pa. 1900) (precluding recovery for gratuitous
nursing services provided by plaintiff s daughter, despite the fact that she quit her job in order to
provide the care); Goodhart v. Penn. R.R. Co., 35 A. 191, 192 (Pa. 1896) (holding that a plaintiff
cannot recover for nursing provided by members of his own household, because the care of his
wife and minor children involves the performance of the ordinary offices of affection, which is
his duty; but it involves no legal liability on his part, and therefore affords no basis for a claim
against a defendant for expenses incurred).
75. Daniels v. Celeste, 21 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Mass. 1939) (holding that the collateral source rule
does not protect services provided free of charge-in order to recover damages, the plaintiff must
either have incurred liability or will incur future liability); Biddle v. Griffin, 277 A.2d 691, 692
(Del. Super. Ct. 1970) (reciting a state rule that because a "loved one rendering free unskilled
nursing services to a family member does not do so for compensation, . . the value of such
services may not be recovered by the injured party in a tort action"). The Illinois Supreme Court
adopted this rule. See infra Part II.D.2 (describing the Peterson decision).
76. Olariu v. Marrero, 549 S.E.2d 121, 123-24 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff
may not recover compensatory damages for medical expenses discharged in bankruptcy because
bankruptcy does not constitute a collateral source; and also because allowing so would encourage
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3. Rationales for the Collateral Source Rule
Perhaps the most common justification for the collateral source rule
is that the defendant should not be allowed to benefit from the
plaintiff's foresight in acquiring insurance. 77 Under this "benefit of the
bargain" theory, a wrongdoer should not benefit from the fact that the
injured plaintiff made payments to acquire insurance coverage. 78 In
such an instance, a plaintiff has paid consideration for these benefits,
committing resources that otherwise could have been put toward a
different use. 79 If a plaintiff has invested in insurance premiums, he
should be the one to receive the benefits from those premiums-not the
defendant who made no such expenditures. 80 Because the defendant did
not make an expenditure for the insurance contract, he should not reap
the benefits.81 If the benefit is shifted to the defendant, the plaintiff is in
a worse situation than if he had never bothered to acquire insurance
coverage.82 In such a case, the benefit of the premium payments would
be shifted to the defendant instead of the plaintiff.83
Moreover, proponents of the collateral source rule argue that the
doctrine supports public policy by acknowledging that it is beneficial to
encourage the public to acquire insurance coverage. 84  Allowing a
defendant to benefit from a plaintiffs insurance coverage would be a
bankruptcy, which is against public policy); Oliver v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 505 N.W.2d 452,
461 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the plaintiff could not recover medical bills that had been
discharged in bankruptcy because no benefits had been provided by a third party but instead were
the result of the plaintiff's own act).
77. Unreason, supra note 65, at 748-49 (listing this first among a list of justifications, on the
grounds that it is the oldest and most often cited reason for the rule).
78. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 408 (2004) (citing Taylor v. Jennison, 335 S.W.2d 902 (Ky.
1960), Anderson v. Miller, 33 S.W. 615 (Tenn. 1896), and Criez v. Sunset Motor Co., 213 P. 7
(Wash. 1923)).
79. Overton v. United States, 619 F.2d. 1299, 1306 (8th Cir. 1980).
80. Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 66 (Cal. 1970); Grayson v. Williams,
256 F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958); Muranyi v. Turn Verein Frisch-Auf, 719 N.E.2d 366, 369 (IEl.
App. Ct. 1999) (citing Beaird v. Brown, 373 N.E.2d 1055, 1057 (Ell. App. Ct. 1978)) (recognizing
that a reduction "of a plaintiffs damages by the amount of his insurance proceeds would deprive
him not of a mere gratuity, but of the benefit of his bargain").
81. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Wightman's Adm'r., 70 Va. 431, 446 (1877). "[T]he party
effecting the insurance paid full value for it, and there is no equity in the claim of the defendant to
the benefit of a contract for which it gave no consideration." Id.
82. Helfend, 465 P.2d at 66.
83. Id.; Grayson, 256 F.2d at 65.
84. Bozeman v. Louisiana, 879 So. 2d 692, 704 (La. 2004) (arguing the collateral source rule
encourages citizens to purchase insurance). See also Helfend, 465 P.2d at 66 (arguing that
without the collateral source rule, there would be less incentive to acquire insurance coverage).
2006] The Collateral Source Rule in Illinois
disincentive to the public to acquire coverage, 85 granting the tortfeasor
an "unjust enrichment. 86
A second argument is that if anyone receives a windfall, it is best that
it be the injured party rather than the tortfeasor.87 If a decision must be
made between the parties, an impartial person would most likely side
with the innocent victim.88 Allowing the "windfall" to shift to the
defendant would result in the defendant benefiting from his wrongful
act, and would relieve him of the full responsibility for his
wrongdoing.89
Another justification for the collateral source rule is that tort law is
supposed to have a deterrent effect.90 Commentators argue that if
courts do not require defendants to pay the full amount of damages they
cause, this deterrent effect will be diminished. 91 Although the reality of
such deterrence is debatable, some studies indicate that money damages
actually do deter tortious conduct. 92
85. Bozeman, 879 So. 2d at 704 (noting that in such an instance the payment of premiums by
the plaintiff would yield no benefit to him).
86. Beaird v. Brown, 373 N.E.2d 1055, 1057-58 (Iil. App. Ct. 1978) (citing Ullman v.
Wolverine Ins. Co., 269 N.E.2d 295, 300 (111. 1970) (Ward, J., dissenting)) (stating that it would
be unjust enrichment to allow a defendant to benefit from plaintiff's payment of insurance
premiums).
87. Grayson, 256 F.2d at 65; Werner v. Lane, 393 A.2d 1329, 1335-36 (Me. 1978). This
justification for the collateral source rule was specifically rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court.
See infra Part II.D.2 (discussing the Peterson decision).
88. Branton, supra note 71, at 889 (posing a hypothetical, the author claims that uninterested
parties would award any windfall to the injured person, rather than the tortfeasor). Supporters of
the rule also argue that a reasonable person would not choose to be injured, even if he was fully
compensated for that injury. Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (arguing
that "[l]egal 'compensation' for personal injuries does not actually compensate"). In other words,
not many people would sell their arm for the amount typically recovered in a lawsuit for loss of
an arm. Id.
89. Grayson, 256 F.2d at 65. Perhaps the most cited explanation of this theory was provided
in this opinion, when the court wrote:
Where a part of a wrongdoer's liability is discharged by payment from a collateral
source, as here, the question arises who shall benefit therefrom, the wrongdoer or the
injured person. No reason in law, equity or good conscience can be advanced why a
wrongdoer should benefit from part payment from a collateral source of damages
caused by his wrongful act. If there must be a windfall certainly it is more just that the
injured person shall profit therefrom, rather than the wrongdoer shall be relieved of his
full responsibility for his wrongdoing.
Id.
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 38, at § 901(c) (stating that one of the
purposes of tort damages is to "punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct").
91. Christian D. Saine, Preserving the Collateral Source Rule: Modern Theories of Tort Law
and a Proposal for Practical Application, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1075, 1092-97 (1997)
(presenting research supporting the idea that compensatory damages have a deterrent effect).
92. Id. at 1092-97. In contrast, see Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of
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Supporters also argue that the collateral source rule helps ensure that
a plaintiff is fully compensated for a tortious injury.93  Because of
litigation costs and attorney fees, double recovery rarely occurs. 94 In
most cases, when a plaintiff receives the full amount of damages, the
legal expenses combine with subrogation rights to provide a fair
outcome. 95  The California Supreme Court endorsed this view, noting
that a plaintiff's attorney usually receives a large portion of the
plaintiffs recovery, and, therefore, the collateral source rule to some
extent serves to compensate for the attorney's share and does not
actually result in a double recovery.96 Similarly, supporters suggest that
the rule promotes efficiency, given that the plaintiffs attorney often
serves the interests of both the injured plaintiff and the collateral source
maintaining its subrogation rights. 97
The rule has also been defended for the same reason it is most often
criticized-its perceived punitive effect.98  The collateral source rule
requires a tortfeasor to compensate for all harm that he causes, rather
than just the plaintiffs net loss.99  Even when the plaintiff has not
suffered a net financial loss, under the collateral source rule, damages
are not reduced. 100 If not for the rule, the individual recovery of two
Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 381-87 (1994) (providing a
comprehensive list of recent authors who doubt the deterrent effect of tort liability and the factors
they suggest mitigate deterrence).
93. David L. Edwards, Note, Jurgensen v. Smith: Shutting The Door on Collateral Source
Evidence in South Dakota, 46 S.D. L. REV. 316, 331-32 (2001); Unreason, supra note 65, at 750.
94. Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit
Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 68 (Cal. 1970); John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss
Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1478, 1480-84 (1966).
95. Saine, supra note 91, at 1098.
96. Helfend, 465 P.2d at 68.
97. Id. Otherwise, both the plaintiff and the collateral source would be required to obtain
legal representation in order to assert their rights against the tortfeasor. Id.
98. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Loescher, 291 N.W.2d 216, 222-23 (Minn. 1988) (stating
that "[a]lthough the [plaintiff] may be overcompensated, the collateral source rule requires that a
wrongdoer pay for the full extent of the damages he or she has caused.").
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 38, at § 920A cmt. b. The Restatement
provides:
A payment made by a tortfeasor or by a person acting for him to a person whom he has
injured is credited against his tort liability, as are payments made by another who is, or
believes he is, subject to the same tort liability.
Payments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources are not
credited against the tortfeasor's liability, although they cover all or a part of the harm
for which the tortfeasor is liable.
Id.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 38, at § 924 cmt. c. "The damages are
not reduced by the fact that the plaintiff has suffered no net financial loss as the result of the
entire transaction, as when he receives insurance money or an amount equal to his lost wages
2006] The Collateral Source Rule in Illinois
plaintiffs who were similarly injured would be based on the type of their
insurance coverage, rather than the nature of their injuries. 101
Proponents of this theory argue that without the collateral source rule,
defendants would get a break if they harmed a poor person whose
medical bills were paid by Medicaid. 10 2
A final argument for the doctrine is that medical expenses are often
the best barometers for juries to assess plaintiffs' injuries, and for
attorneys to value cases for settlement purposes. 103 Under this theory, if
the collateral source rule allows a plaintiff to inflate the dollar amount
of his economic damages, more money will also be awarded for
indefinable damages such as pain and suffering. 10 4 Similarly, courts
have repeatedly applied the evidentiary function of the rule to prevent
the jury from learning of collateral payments. 10 5 The fear is that a jury
may become confused or misled if presented with evidence that a
plaintiff received money from parties other than the defendant. 106
4. Criticism of the Collateral Source Rule
Academic criticism of the collateral source rule began to flourish in
the middle of the twentieth century. 107 The perceived punitive effect of
from his employer or from a friend." Id.
101. Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1162 (Haw. 2004); Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 630
N.W.2d 201, 210 (Wis. 2001) ("Applying the collateral source rule to payments that have been
reduced by contractual arrangements between insurers and health care providers assures that the
liability of similarly situated defendants is not dependent on the relative fortuity of the manner in
which each plaintiff's medical expenses are financed.").
102. Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So. 2d 611, 619 (Miss. 2001). Stated more
explicitly, a defendant "does not get a break on damages just because it caused permanent injuries
to a poor person" whose medical bills were discounted by Medicaid. Id.
103. See, e.g., Stephen G. Olson, Is the Collateral Source Rule Applicable to Medicare and
Medicaid Write-offs?, 71 DEF. COUNS. J. 172, 178 (2004) (arguing that a "real danger" of the
collateral source rule is that the higher damage award is often used as a benchmark to determine
.'compensation for more intangible injuries such as pain and suffering"). See also Smithers v. C
& G Custom Module Hauling, 172 F. Supp. 2d 765, 778 (E.D. Va. 2000) (explaining that any
increase in the base amount of damages due to recovery of medical discounts will likely form a
basis to demand and receive additional compensation for more intangible injuries such as pain
and suffering).
104. Olson, supra note 103, at 178.
105. 3-110 ILLINOIS FORMS OF JURY INSTRUCTION § 110.30 (2005). The Illinois Supreme
Court Committee on Jury Instructions in Civil Cases notes that "juries may sometimes speculate
or be concerned about whether a plaintiff has or will receive compensation in addition to any
damages award." Id. The jury instruction is to be read even when no direct evidence of collateral
sources has been presented because collateral sources may be inferred from the evidence or the
experiences of the jury members. Id.
106. Beard, supra note 14, at 460 (citing Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61,
68 (Cal. 1970), and Tipton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 375 U.S. 34, 36 (1963)).
107. HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS (1968 Supp.) § 25.22, at p. 152. See also
Helfend, 465 P.2d at 64 n.6 (citing the following articles and commentaries criticizing the
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
the collateral source rule is often criticized, as some argue that the
application of the collateral source rule overcompensates plaintiffs. 10 8
Opponents argue that this overcompensation contradicts the policy of
modem tort law, which aims to compensate the victim in an attempt to
make him whole, not to punish the tortfeasor. 10 9 This argument is
based on the premise that once a plaintiff is compensated, regardless of
the source, the victim should not be compensated a second time by the
wrongdoer. 110 By forcing the tortfeasor to pay damages to a plaintiff
who has already been made whole, the damages serve solely as a
punishment to the tortfeasor. 111 Under this perspective, allowing such
"double recoveries" overcompensates plaintiffs and places them in a
better position than before the tort occurred, while at the same time the
damages awarded merely serve to punish the defendant rather than
compensating the injured party. 112 Accordingly, under this argument
the operation of the collateral source rule violates the principal purposes
of compensatory damages. 113
Another argument against the collateral source rule is that the
doctrine conflicts with mitigation principles. 114  Pursuant to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, if a plaintiff has received a benefit due
to an injury caused by the defendant, the defendant should be able to
use the value of the benefit to mitigate damages. 115 According to this
collateral source rule: "Fleming, Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1478 (1966);
James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 537 (1952); Schwartz, The Collateral Source Rule, 41 B.U. L. REV. 348 (1961); West, The
Collateral Source Rule Sans Subrogation: A Plaintiff's Windfall, 16 OKLA. L. REV. 395; Note,
Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1964)").
108. Victor E. Schwartz, Tort Law Reform: Strict Liability and the Collateral Source Rule Do
Not Mix, 39 VAND. L. REV. 569, 570-72 (1986) (arguing that the collateral source rule results in
overcompensation in product liability cases).
109. Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 392 N.E.2d 1, 5 (111. 1979); Wilson v. Hoffman
Group, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 524, 530 (Ill. 1989); F.B.C. Stores, Inc. v. Duncan, 198 S.E.2d 595, 599
(Va. 1973).
110. Fleming, supra note 94, at 1481-85 (presenting academic critiques of the collateral
source rule).
111. Peterson, 392 N.E.2d at 5.
112. See Julie A. Schafer, The Constitutionality of Offsetting Collateral Benefits Under Ohio
Revised Code Section 2317.45, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 587, 590 (1992) (reviewing common criticisms
of the collateral source rule).
113. Wilson, 546 N.E.2d at 530 (explaining that compensatory damages are not intended to
punish the tortfeasor or bestow a windfall upon the plaintiff).
114. Antracoli, supra note 70, at 670 (reviewing the inherent conflict between the collateral
source rule and the concept of tort mitigation).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 38, at § 920. "When the defendant's
tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a
special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is
considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable." Id.
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theory, because the defendant's conduct has produced a benefit to the
plaintiff, that benefit should be a mitigating factor when calculating
damages. 116  However, one court rejected this argument noting that
allowing a defendant to mitigate damages with insurance benefits would
result in the plaintiff being worse off than if she had never purchased
insurance, because her payment of premiums would result in no
benefit. 1 1 7
C. Medical Discounts
Like almost every other industry and service in the United States,
healthcare has seen rapid developments in recent years." 8 In addition
to technological and scientific advances, the economics and business of
healthcare have also evolved. 119 This Section begins with a brief
history of organized health care and the development of the modem
practice of providing discounts for medical services. 120 It then reviews
how various jurisdictions have approached these medical discounts in
light of the collateral source rule. 12 1
1. The Growth of the Health Care Industry and
Discounting of Medical Bills
As the collateral source rule was expanded and limited by the courts
during the second half of the twentieth century, significant changes
occurred in the health care industry. Until the Great Depression, health
insurance was generally rare. 122 Doctors and other health care provid-
ers had significant power in setting fees because patients generally had
little bargaining power. 123  During the Depression, government-
sponsored plans such as Blue Cross were created. 124 Under these health
116. Branton, supra note 71, at 886. Proponents of this argument believe that without such
mitigation any damages awarded are punitive rather than compensatory, since the plaintiff has
already been compensated. Id.
117. Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 66 (Cal. 1970) (arguing that under
such an approach the benefit of the premiums paid by the plaintiff would be realized by the
defendant, rather than the plaintiff).
118. See infra Part II.C.1.
119. Id.
120. See infra Part II.C. 1 (reviewing the recent development of health care as an industry, and
the modem trend of granting discounts to insurers in exchange for a steady supply of clients).
121. See infra Part fI.C.2 (surveying various approaches jurisdictions have taken toward the
issue of whether a plaintiff may recover damages for the discounted portions of medical bills).
122. Beard, supra note 14, at 461.
123. Id. During this era, doctors based their fees "more on the patient's ability to pay than
anything else." Id.
124. Sylvia A. Law, Negotiating Physicians' Fees: Individual Patients or Society? (A Case
Study in Federalism), 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1986). Blue Cross originated in Dallas in 1929,
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plans, the premiums were the same for everyone within a given com-
munity, regardless of health history. 125  After World War II, health
insurance became even more common, as employers used health cover-
age as an incentive when recruiting potential employees.
126
As the health-insurance industry grew, so did its leverage. 127
Medical charges became flexible, as the insurance companies used their
new power to negotiate lower fee schedules with medical providers. 128
HMOs and public health programs such as Medicaid and Medicare also
commanded significant discounts for medical care. 129  Under these
reduced fee schedules, medical providers accept as payment in full a
discounted portion of the amount initially billed to the patient. 130  The
providers then "write off' the discount, and the original debt is
discharged. 131 Although health care providers gave up their billing
providing teachers with 21 days of hospitalization in exchange for a pre-payment of 50 cents per
month. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BlueCross (last visited February 8, 2006). Similar plans began to
spread nationally, including the lumber and mining camps of the Pacific Northwest. Id. These
West Coast plans eventually evolved into Blue Shield in 1939. Id. Today, Blue Cross operates as
hospital insurance, and Blue Shield operates as physician insurance. See ROBERT CUNNINGHAM
11I & ROBERT M. CUNNINGHAM JR., THE BLUES: A HISTORY OF THE BLUE CROSS AND BLUE
SHIELD SYSTEM (N. Ill. Univ. Press 1998). Blue Cross and Blue Shield operate as intertwined,
nonprofit institutions, and act as the principal intermediary between federal health programs (such
as Medicare) and their clients. Id.
125. Law, supra note 124, at 10 (discussing the evolution of health care during the early
twentieth century).
126. M. RAFFEL, THE U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM: ORIGINS AND FUNCTIONS 244 (3d ed. 1989).
The government froze wages during the war, so employers began to offer health benefits as a
substitute for higher wages. Id. Between the early 1940s and the late 1960s, organized labor
bargained for an expansive package of service benefits for workers and dependents alike. Id.
127. Beard, supra note 14, at 453-54.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 463-66. Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs") provide a form of health
insurance coverage, but differ from traditional insurance policies in that the care provided in an
HMO generally follows a set of guidelines by the HMO. See Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia,
Health Maintenance Organization, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Health-maintenance-organization
(last visited February 9, 2006) (explaining the function of an HMO). Under this model, providers
contract with an HMO to receive more patients and in return usually agree to provide services at a
discount. Id. This allows HMOs to charge lower monthly premiums than typical indemnity
insurance. Id. HMOs attempt to gain an advantage over traditional insurance plans by managing
their patients' health care and reducing unnecessary services by requiring members to select a
primary care physician, who acts as a "gatekeeper" to medical services. Id. Medicare and
Medicaid are federal programs that were signed into law on July 30, 1965, by President Lyndon
B. Johnson. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services: History, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/History/0IlOverview.asp#TopOfPage (last visited
February 10, 2006). Medicare coverage is available to those over 65 years of age, while
Medicaid is available to lower-income households. Id.
130. Olson, supra note 103, at 172.
131. Id.
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power, in return they received a steady supply of patients and
guaranteed payment. 132
Discounting of medical bills has become a common practice in
contemporary healthcare. 133 Insurance companies in Illinois receive an
average discount of 40% for their customers' hospital bills.134 Experts
have stated that modem health care prices are as inflated as list prices
for new cars; they are amounts that everyone knows are inaccurate, and
no one actually pays them. 135  Courts have found that these discounts
are due to the power and size of the entities paying such medical
bills. 136 The collateral source rule has received increased criticism over
the past twenty-five years because of these changes, as commentators
have labeled recovery of these discounts as "windfalls" or "phantom
damages."1 37
2. Cases Addressing Medical Discounts
The development of discounts in the health care industry has created
a new question in the collateral source rule debate-may a plaintiff
recover the amount originally billed, or are his damages limited to the
amount actually paid? 138  Both sides present strong arguments,
structured largely around the policy arguments surrounding the
132. N.C. v. A.W., 713 N.E.2d 775, 776-77 (111. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that a medical
provider could not place a lien on plaintiffs' recovery for an amount exceeding what was accepted
as payment in full, the court wrote that although the provider only received 18.6 cents on the
dollar as payment, the provider benefited from an increased number of patients in exchange for
the reduced rate). Finding that the provider itself had bargained for and assented to the reduced
rate, the court stated that "it is a little late for [the provider] to experience buyer's remorse over its
own voluntary contract." Id. at 777. The health care provider benefits from such contracts
because the insureds are usually able to seek treatment from only a limited number of facilities.
Id.
133. Arthur v. Catour, 803 N.E.2d 647, 649 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (citing Mitchell v. Hayes, 72
F. Supp. 2d 635, 637 (W.D. Va. 1999) and Beard, supra note 14, at 463-66).
134. Brief for Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Defendants-Appellants at 12, Arthur v. Catour, 216 Ill. 2d 72 (2005) (No. 97920). Amicus
retained a consulting firm to survey Illinois health insurers, which determined that the seven
largest insurers in the state received discounts between 34 and 53%. Id.
135. Lucette Lagundo, Full Price: A Young Woman, an Appendectomy, and a $19,000 Debt,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2003, at 1. "In some ways, hospital charges are like automobile 'list
prices' or hotel 'rack rates'-posted prices that everybody knows nobody pays." Id.
136. Arthur, 803 N.E.2d at 649 (explaining that such discounts are "a consequence of the
power wielded by those entities, such as insurance companies, employers and governmental
bodies, who pay the bills") (citing Beard, supra note 14, at 453).
137. Beard, supra note 14, at 458-61 (arguing that it is inequitable and unjust to allow
plaintiffs to recover these "'windfalls"); Olson, supra note 103, at 173-75 (labeling recovery of
medical discounts as "phantom damages"). See supra Part H.B.4 (discussing criticisms of the
collateral source rule).
138. Beard, supra note 14, at 470-71.
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collateral source rule itself.139  Although the majority of jurisdictions
allow recovery of the amount billed regardless of any discount, some
state courts limit awards to the amount actually paid on behalf of the
plaintiff. 140
Most of the jurisdictions restricting recovery to the amount paid have
based their decisions on state statutory limitations on the collateral
source rule. 141 For example, an Idaho court held that the intent of a
state statute prevented double recovery by a plaintiff receiving damages
for medical discounts. 14 2  Courts in Florida, 143 New York, 144 and
Montana 145 also relied on state statutes that expressed a policy against
plaintiffs receiving double recoveries.
Even courts in California and Pennsylvania, states without statutes
limiting the collateral source rule, have still determined that plaintiffs
may not recover the discounted portion of medical bills. 146  In these
decisions, the courts focused on the fact that damages are meant to
compensate plaintiffs for their medical expenses, not to punish
defendants. 147 Hence, the expenses must be restricted to the costs that
were actually incurred. 148  Relying on the Restatement, the courts
concluded that the collateral source rule did not apply to the discounted
139. See supra Parts II.B.3-B.4 (presenting arguments both in favor and in opposition to the
collateral source rule).
140. Robinson v. Bates, 828 N.E.2d 657, 669 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (listing state court
decisions limiting recovery to the amount actually paid).
141. Id. at 669-71 (reviewing cases from Idaho, Florida, and Montana where the courts relied
on state statutes).
142. Dyet v. McKinley, 81 P.3d 1236, 1239 (Idaho 2003) (holding that a plaintiff may not
recover for Medicare write-offs).
143. See Coop. Leasing Inc. v. Johnson, 872 So. 2d 956, 960 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that pursuant to state statute, Medicare benefits are not a collateral source, and therefore
are not recoverable, because the plaintiff never became liable and the federal government has no
right to reimbursement).
144. See Kastick v. U-Haul Co., 740 N.Y.S.2d 167, 169 (2002) (holding that amounts written
off by a medical provider are not payments from a collateral source within the meaning of state
statute, since the plaintiff did not incur liability).
145. See generally Chapman v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (D. Mont.
1998) (holding that plaintiff's recovery was limited to the amount paid by Medicaid due to a state
statute, but allowing admission of plaintiff s medical bills to show the jury the severity and extent
of her injuries and to establish required future medical care and expenses).
146. See Hanif v. Housing Auth. of Yolo County, 200 Cal. App. 3d 635, 643-44 (Ct. App.
1988) (declining to award plaintiff amount in excess of the amount actually paid by Medi-Cal);
Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786, 791 (Pa. 2001) (holding that the collateral
source rule did not require that plaintiff recover the amount of the Medicaid write-off since no
one incurred the written-off amount).
147. Moorhead, 765 A.2d at 790-91.
148. Id.
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portions because no collateral source actually paid those charges. 149
Although these decisions are still good law in both states, other
decisions barring recovery of discounted amounts were later overruled
in Virginia, 150 Louisiana,151 and Kansas. 152
The majority of jurisdictions that have addressed this issue allow full
recovery of discounted medical bills.153  Courts in the District of
Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri,
New Hampshire, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin have
ruled that plaintiffs may recover the amounts discounted from their
medical bills. 154  Under these cases, the collateral source rule protects
medical discounts, finding them to be a benefit of the plaintiff's bargain
with his insurance carrier. 155 Consequently, a court or jury may not
reduce damage awards by the amount of the discount received by the
plaintiff s insurer. 156  Some courts have also addressed the evidentiary
component of the collateral source rule, holding that neither the amount
149. Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1159 n.19 (Haw. 2004) (noting that both Hanif and
Moorhead erroneously relied upon Restatement § 911 cmt. h (1977), "which specifically
references the reasonable exchange value of 'services tortiously obtained by the defendant's fraud
or duress, or for the value of services rendered in an attempt to mitigate damages"'). For a more
detailed discussion of this misapplication of the Restatement, see infra Part IV.A.
150. Mitchell v. Hayes, 72 F. Supp. 2d 635, 637 (W.D. Va. 1999) and McAmis v. Wallace,
980 F. Supp. 181, 185 (W.D. Va. 1997), overruled by Acuar v. Letourneau, 531 S.E.2d 316, 322
(Va. 2000).
151. Cook v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2, 876 So. 2d 173, 178-79 (La. Ct. App.
2004); Suhor v. Lagasse, 770 So. 2d 422, 427 (La. Ct. App. 2000); Terrell v. Nanda, 759 So. 2d
1026, 1031 (La. Ct. App. 2000) overruled by Bozeman v. Louisiana, 879 So. 2d 692 (La. 2004)
(stating that amounts written off by the health care provider through Medicare and private
insurance, where consideration is provided for the benefit, are recoverable).
152. Bates v. Hogg, 921 P.2d 249 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996), later restricted by Rose v. Via Christi
Health System, Inc., 78 P.3d 798 (Kan. 2003).
153. Robinson v. Bates, 828 N.E.2d 657, 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (surveying developing
trends among courts on the issue of whether to allow recovery of medical discounts).
154. Id. at 665-69 (citing and reviewing the following opinions that allowed a plaintiff to
recover amounts discounted by health care providers: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So.
2d 1135 (Miss. 2002); Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So. 2d 611 (Miss. 2001); Hardi v.
Mezzanotte, 818 A.2d 974 (D.C. 2003); Acuar v. Letourneau, 531 S.E.2d 316 (Va. 2000); Bynum
v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149 (Haw. 2004); Haselden v. Davis, 579 S.E.2d 293 (S.C. 2003); Koffman
v. Leichtfuss, 630 N.W.2d 201 (Wis. 2001); Olariu v. Marrero, 549 S.E.2d 121 (Ga. Ct. App.
2001); Candler Hosp., Inc., v. Dent, 491 S.E.2d 868 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Brown v. Van Noy, 879
S.W.2d 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Bozeman v. Louisiana, 879 So. 2d 692 (La. 2004); Rose v. Via
Christi Health System, nc.,78 P.3d 798 (Kan. 2003)).
155. See, e.g., Acuar, 531 S.E.2d at 322 ("[T]he focal point of the collateral source rule is not
whether an injured party has 'incurred' certain medical expenses. Rather, it is whether a tort
victim has received benefits from a collateral source that cannot be used to reduce the amount of
damages owed by a tortfeasor.").
156. Id.
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written off nor the amount accepted as payment in full may be presented
as evidence that the amount originally charged was unreasonable.
157
According to these cases, the collateral source rule provides that the
tortfeasor should not receive the benefit from the plaintiff's contracts
with third parties. 158 A reduction of the plaintiffs damages because of
medical discounts would in effect reward the defendant for injuring a
person with comprehensive insurance. 159  As illustrated by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, one plaintiff may be uninsured, another's
insurer may pay full value, and the third's insurer may receive a sizable
discount. 160 Without the collateral source rule, the defendant's liability
could vary in each case even where the injuries and medical bills were
the same for each plaintiff.161
Courts allowing plaintiffs to recover the full amount billed have also
cited many of the policy arguments presented above to support their
conclusions. 162 According to one court, the collateral source rule is best
understood by focusing on its effect on the tortfeasor rather than the
plaintiff, and failure to apply it to medical discounts would provide a
windfall to the wrongdoer. 163 If there must be a windfall, it is most just
for that windfall to go to the injured party. 164 Courts have also reasoned
that allowing recovery of the discounted amounts deters tortious
conduct and encourages the acquisition of insurance coverage. 165
157. Radvany v. Davis, 551 S.E.2d 347, 348 (Va. 2001) (holding that a defendant may not
present the amount accepted as payment in full as evidence that the amount originally billed is
unreasonable).
158. Acuar, 531 S.E.2d at 322.
159. Koffman, 630 N.W.2d at 209-10.
160. Id. (presenting a hypothetical to illustrate the inequities that would result absent the
application of the collateral source rule to medical discounts).
161. Id.
162. See supra Part II.B.3 (reviewing justifications for the collateral source rule).
163. Griffin v. La. Sheriff's Auto Risk Ass'n, 802 So. 2d 691, 715 (La. Ct. App. 2001)
(reviewing policy justifications in favor of applying the collateral source rule to medical
discounts).
164. Acuar v. Letourneau, 531 S.E.2d 316, 323 (Va. 2000) (explaining that because "[a]
plaintiff who receives a double recovery for a single tort enjoys a windfall, [and] a defendant who
escapes, in whole or in part, liability for his wrong enjoys a windfall[,] [the] law must sanction
one windfall and deny the other[-]it favors the victim of the wrong rather than the wrongdoer").
See also Koffman, 630 N.W.2d at 210-11 (arguing that justice calls for an award of any windfall
to the less culpable party).
165. Griffin, 802 So. 2d at 715.
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D. The Collateral Source Rule in Illinois
Illinois has long recognized the collateral source rule, but it also
imposes restrictions on the doctrine. 166 This Section begins with a
history of the adoption and expansion of the collateral source rule in
Illinois, as well as policy justifications. 167 Next, it discusses limits and
restrictions the Illinois Supreme Court has placed on the collateral
source rule. 168
1. Adoption and Development of the
Collateral Source Rule in Illinois
The collateral source rule is firmly established in Illinois and has
even been adopted within the state's standard jury instructions. 169 The
Illinois Supreme Court's rationale for recognizing the rule in Illinois is
to protect the benefit of the plaintiff's bargain, preventing the defendant
from benefiting from payments made by the plaintiff or from taking
advantage of contracts between the plaintiff and third persons. 170
The Illinois Supreme Court first adopted the rule in 1870, in a case
involving a railroad accident. 17 1 Over the next thirty years, the state's
appellate courts applied the rule often, usually in dram shop suits1 72 or
claims against railroad companies. 17 3 The courts in all of these early
Illinois cases protected insurance benefits, 17 4 and the rule as stated by
166. See infra Parts II.D.1-D.2 (describing the history of and limitations on the collateral
source rule in Illinois).
167. See infra Part I.D. I (discussing the collateral source rule in Illinois jurisprudence as well
as policy justifications for adherence to the rule).
168. See infra Part ll.D.2 (discussing the Illinois rule that a plaintiff may not recover damages
for services that are provided gratuitously).
169. ILLINOIS FORMS OF JURY INSTRUCTION § 30.22 (2005). The Illinois pattern instruction
reads, "If you find for the plaintiff you shall not speculate about or consider any possible sources
of benefits the plaintiff may have received or might receive. After you have returned your verdict
the court will make whatever adjustments are necessary in this regard." Id.
170. Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 524, 530 (111. 1989); 11 ILL. JUR. Personal
Injury & Torts § 5:63 (2002).
171. Pittsburg, C. & S. L. R. Co. v. Thompson, 56 Ill. 138, 143 (1870) (refusing a jury
instruction regarding an insurance policy covering the plaintiff, the court held that "any sum paid
to the plaintiff by an accident insurance company, was properly refused. If such sum was paid, it
was not pro tanto a discharge of the railway company. The primary liability was on this
company."). See also 11 ILL. JUR. Personal Injury & Torts § 5:63 (2002) (describing the initial
adoption of the collateral source rule in Illinois).
172. Deel v. Heiligenstein, 91 N.E. 429, 431 (Ill. 1910) (refusing a jury instruction regarding
life insurance coverage in a dram shop suit); Whiteside v. O'Connors, 162 ill. App. 108, 117-18
(App. Ct. 1911) (refusing evidence of insurance coverage in a dram shop case).
173. Cox v. Chicago, 83 Ill. App. 540, 542 (App. Ct. 1899) (rejecting evidence about
plaintiff s insurance coverage in claim against a railroad).
174. Id. at 542 (finding error in allowing defense attorney to prove, against objections by
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modem Illinois courts is almost identical to the language contained in
the Restatement. 175
After the initial adoption, the Illinois Supreme Court did not address
the collateral source rule for over thirty years. In 1904 the court again
applied the doctrine, and for the first time in Illinois, used the term
"collateral source" to describe the principle. 176 Holding that there could
be no offset in a dram shop suit for funeral benefits received from the
decedent's employer, the court stated that such benefits "would accrue
from a collateral source wholly independent" of the defendant railroad
company and presented no grounds for a reduction in damages. 177
Nearly twenty years later, the court expanded the protections of the
collateral source rule beyond insurance benefits in O'Brien v. Chicago
Railway.17 8 In O'Brien the court allowed recovery for lost wages even
though the plaintiff's employer provided gratuitous payments during the
plaintiff's time away from work.179  Illinois appellate courts soon
expanded the collateral source rule's protection of benefits received
from a plaintiffs employer, including the receipt of worker's
plaintiffs attorney, that an insurance company paid plaintiff $150 on account of the accident);
Deel, 91 N.E. at 431 (holding a death insurance policy did not affect widow's "'right to recover
for the loss of the support she was entitled to receive from her husband"); Whiteside, 162 111. App.
at 117-18 (holding that the introduction of evidence as to insurance benefits was wholly
"incompetent and immaterial, and its admission was manifestly prejudicial to the plaintiff in
error"); Consolidated Coal Co. v. Shepherd, 112 Il1. App. 458, 461-62 (App. Ct. 1904) (holding
that evidence of accident insurance benefits received by plaintiff was properly excluded by trial
court).
175. Wilson, 546 N.E.2d at 530 (citing the Restatement and stating that the Illinois rule
provides that "benefits received by the injured party from a source wholly independent of, and
collateral to, the tortfeasor will not diminish damages otherwise recoverable from the tortfeasor");
see also Bernier v. Burns, 497 N.E.2d 763, 774-75 (Ill. 1986) (citing the Restatement when
stating the collateral source rule).
176. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Prickett, 71 N.E. 435, 436 (IIl. 1904) (holding that it was immaterial
whether the widow of a deceased railroad engineer received life insurance benefits because "[a]ny
such mortuary benefit would accrue from a collateral source, wholly independent of the appellant
company, and would present no ground for an abatement of the pecuniary loss occasioned by the
death of the appellee's intestate to his widow and next of kin").
177. Id.
178. O'Brien v. Chicago Ry. Co., 137 N.E. 214, 221 (Ill. 1922). In O'Brien, the plaintiff was
a city employee who was struck by a train while working. Id. at 215. Rejecting the defendant's
argument that the plaintiffs recovery was limited to worker's compensation benefits, the court
stated that "[n]o injustice is done to a person negligently injuring another in requiring him to pay
the full amount of damages for which he is legally liable, without deduction for compensation
which the injured person may receive from another source which has no connection with the
negligence, whether that source is a claim for compensation against his employer, a policy of
insurance against accidents, a life insurance policy, a benefit from a fraternal organization or a
gift from a friend." Id. at 221.
179. Id.
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compensation benefits and vacation pay. 180 The collateral source rule
currently applies to almost all forms of insurance and worker's
compensation benefits. 181
Like most jurisdictions, in Illinois the rule serves as both a rule of
damages and a rule of evidence. The rule protects collateral payments
that benefit the plaintiff by denying the defendant any corresponding
offset or credit. 182  These collateral benefits do not reduce the
defendant's tort liability, even though they reduce the plaintiff s loss. 183
The rule also functions to prevent juries from learning anything about
collateral proceeds received by plaintiffs. 184 In Illinois, revealing that a
plaintiff had insurance can be prejudicial error, because a jury could
conclude that the plaintiff sustained no actual damages since his
medical bills were paid by insurance. 185
2. Limits on the Collateral Source Rule in Illinois
Despite these numerous applications of the collateral source rule,
Illinois is one of the few states with common law restrictions on the
180. Cooney v. Yellow Cab Co., 34 N.E.2d 566, 570 (111. App. Ct. 1940) (holding that a
plaintiff could recover lost wages regardless of whether his employer actually compensated the
plaintiff while he was injured and away from work); Hoobler v. Voelpel, 246 Ill. App. 69, 78-79
(App. Ct. 1927) (refusing to permit the defendant to take advantage of the plaintiffs employment
contract to mitigate damages, the court allowed the plaintiff to recover damages despite his
receipt of worker's compensation benefits and stated that "the general and more reasonable rule is
that the gratuitous payment in such case will not preclude recovery for such loss of time, on the
theory that the wrongdoer can have no concern with the transaction between the employer and the
employee, and the amount so paid is not to be regarded, under the circumstances, as in any sense
compensation for lost time but rather as a gratuity given by one to the other out of relations of
friendship or sympathy between them").
181. See Harden v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 633 N.E.2d 764, 772 (111. App. Ct. 1993)
(holding that breach of employment claims cannot be offset with unemployment compensation);
Fear v. Smith, 539 N.E.2d 1297, 1302 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (protecting benefits received from
worker's compensation and disability insurance); Logman v. Jasiek, 414 N.E.2d 520, 525 (111.
App. Ct. 1980) (allowing recovery of gratuitous payment of medical bills made by plaintiffs
parents); Fejes v. State, 46 Ill. Ct. Cl. 109, 111 (Ct. Cl. 1994) (protecting life insurance benefits).
182. Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 851 (111. 2005).
183. Id.
184. Wolfe v. Whipple, 251 N.E.2d 77, 82 (111. 1969). Stressing the importance of this aspect
of the collateral source rule, the court wrote, "The entire theory of the collateral source rule is to
keep the jury from learning anything about collateral income so that it will not influence the
decision of the jury." Id.
185. Biehler v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 333 N.E.2d 716, 723 (111. App. Ct.
1975); accord Boden v. Crawford, 552 N.E.2d 1287, 1291 (ll. App. Ct. 1990). See also
Davidson v. Loomis, 282 Ill. App. 515, 519 (App. Ct. 1935) (holding it was prejudicial error to
allow cross-examination of plaintiff regarding benefits received from collateral sources for her
injuries); Phelan v. Santelli, 334 N.E.2d 391, 398 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (holding it was improper for
a defendant to pursue a line of questioning designed to suggest that the plaintiff could receive any
necessary future care at free governmental or charitable facilities).
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doctrine. 186 Since 1907, an Illinois plaintiff may not recover the value
of free medical services, 187 although permitted in a majority of
jurisdictions. 188 This approach was reaffirmed and expanded in 1977 in
Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., where the Illinois Supreme
Court determined that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover the value of
services obtained without expense, obligation, or liability. 
189
In Peterson, free medical services were provided to the plaintiff's
child by the Shriner's Hospital, and the plaintiff attempted to recover
the reasonable value of those services in his claim for medical
damages. 190 The Peterson court held that the collateral source rule is
inapplicable in such situations and emphasized the distinction between
gratuitous services and the usual application of the collateral source rule
when insurance is involved. 191 The justification for the rule is that it
186. Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 858-59 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting) (citing Muranyi v. Turn
Verein Frisch-Auf, 719 N.E.2d 366 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)); 11 ILL. JUR. Personal Injury & Torts
§ 5:62 (2002); and M. POLLELLE & B. OTTLEY, ILLINOIS TORT LAW § 24.13 (3d ed. 2000); which
refer to Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 392 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1979).
187. Jones & Adams Co. v. George, 81 N.E. 4, 6 (Ill. 1907) (holding a personal injury
plaintiff could not recover for the value of nursing services gratuitously rendered by the plaintiff's
family). Illinois appellate courts had also prevented recovery of gratuitous medical services in
earlier cases, but note that Illinois appellate decisions prior to 1935 are not binding. Basham v.
Hunt, 773 N.E.2d 1213, 1224 n.3 (App. Ct. 2002). See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Johnson,
24 Ill. App. 468, 471 (App. Ct. 1887) (holding that it was an error to admit evidence of nursing
care provided by plaintiffs daughters because there was no charge for services); Peoria, D. & E.
R. Co. v. Johns, 43 Ill. App. 83, 85 (App. Ct. 1892) (holding that it was an error for plaintiff to
testify about the value of free nursing services provided by his wife because plaintiff was under
no legal obligation to pay those services); Malott v. Woods, 109 111. App. 512, 515 (App. Ct.
1903) (holding that it was improper to instruct the jury that plaintiff was entitled to recover value
of medical services provided by a doctor at no charge). See also J.A. Connelly, Annotation,
Damages for Personal Injury, 90 A.L.R. 2D 1323, 1325-34 (1963) (stating that most jurisdictions
allow recovery of gratuitous services).
188. Dag E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Collateral Source Rule: Receipt Of Public Relief Or
Gratuity As Affecting Recovery In Personal Injury Action, 77 A.L.R. 3D 366, § 2(a) (1977)
(explaining that, in general, the collateral source rule still applies if services are rendered
gratuitously).
189. Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 392 NE.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1979). In Peterson, the
plaintiffs daughter was killed and his son seriously injured in an accident allegedly caused by a
defective braking system in a used car sold by the defendant to a third party. Id. at 2. The two
children were standing near an electrical pole and were struck by the vehicle. Id.
190. Id. at 2, 5. The surviving child, plaintiff's eight-year-old son, suffered significant injuries
resulting in the amputation of his leg. Id. at 2.
191. Id. at 5. The court explained:
[T]he policy behind the collateral-source rule simply is not applicable if the plaintiff
has incurred no expense, obligation, or liability in obtaining the services for which he
seeks compensation. This is further made apparent upon comparison of the present
case with a situation in which the collateral-source rule is frequently applied, that of
the defendant who seeks a reduction in damages because the plaintiff has received
insurance benefits... ["]This rule is usually justified on the basis that the wrongdoer
should not benefit from the expenditures made by the injured party in procuring the
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prevents the wrongdoer from benefiting from expenditures made by the
injured party in obtaining insurance coverage. 192 Because the Peterson
plaintiff did not make any such expenditures, the court saw no reason
for applying the rule. 193
Noting the tension between the concepts of compensatory damages
and the collateral source rule, the Peterson majority "refuse[d] to join
those courts which, without consideration of the facts of each case,
blindly adhere to the collateral source rule." 194  According to the
majority, the purpose of compensatory tort damages is to compensate-
not to punish defendants or bestow windfalls upon plaintiffs. 195 The
court further stated that awarding a windfall to the plaintiff (should a
windfall exist) would be akin to awarding punitive damages, which is a
violation of Illinois policy and common law. 196 In the wake of
Peterson, later decisions emphasized that Illinois policy dictates that
only one recovery should be available for an injury. 197
III. DISCUSSION
In Arthur v. Catour, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a plaintiff
may present the amount initially billed for medical services, but a
defendant may in turn present evidence that the billed amount is not
reasonable. 198 Although the court refused to overturn the Peterson
decision outright, the majority held that medical discounts are protected
by the collateral source rule and are not gratuitous payments. 199 This
Part first presents the facts of the Arthur case and the decision of the
insurance coverage. In a situation in which the injured party incurs no expense,
obligation, or liability, we see no justification for applying the rule.["]
Id. at 5 (emphasis in original) (quoting 22 AM. JUR. 2D, Damages § 210, 293-94 (1965)).
192. Id. (citing 22 AM. JUR. 2D § 210, supra note 191, at 293-94).
193. Id. The collateral source rule was inapplicable because the plaintiff had not paid any
consideration in exchange for free treatment, rather than a lack of expenditure for the treatment
itself. Id.
194. Id. (quoting Unreason, supra note 65, at 742) (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1979)).
196. Id. (citing and rejecting Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958)). The
Peterson opinion explained that "[t]he view that a windfall, if any is to be enjoyed, should go to
the plaintiff borders too closely on approval of unwarranted punitive damages, and it is a view not
espoused by our cases." Id. (citation omitted).
197. Popovich v. Ram Pipe & Supply Co., 412 N.E.2d 518, 521 (Il. 1980) (citing Peterson,
the court offset the amount received from a covenant not to sue from the recovery, reciting state
policy against double recovery in Illinois). See also Dial v. City of O'Fallon, 411 N.E.2d 217,
222 (Ill. 1980) (citing Peterson as an illustration that state policy calls for only one recovery for
an injury).
198. Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ill. 2005).
199. Id.
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trial court. 2 0 0 It discusses the majority opinion of the Appellate Court,
as well as Presiding Justice Holdridge's dissent.20 1 Next, the Illinois
Supreme Court majority opinion is discussed.20 2 Finally, a review of
Chief Justice McMorrow's dissent is presented.20
3
A. The Facts of Arthur and the Trial Court's Ruling
On October 2, 1999, Joyce Arthur stepped in a hole and fell while at
an auction taking place on a farm. 204  Mrs. Arthur fractured her leg
below the knee, requiring surgery.20 5  Mrs. Arthur's medical bills
totaled $19,355.25 and were covered by medical insurance provided
through her husband's employer.20 6  Because of contractual discount
agreements between her healthcare providers and her insurance
company, the insurance company only paid $13,577.97 to satisfy the
billed amounts. 20 7  Her medical providers discharged the remaining
$5,777.28.208
Mrs. Arthur filed suit against both the owner of the farm and the
auction house, alleging negligence. 20 9 Mrs. Arthur's claim for medical
damages was based on the higher amount originally billed, rather than
the amount actually paid.210 Before trial the defendants filed a Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking to limit Mrs. Arthur's medical
damages to the amount paid rather than the amount billed, thus
preventing Mrs. Arthur from claiming the discounted amount of
$5,777.28.21 The circuit court granted the motion and found that
allowing Mrs. Arthur to seek $19,355.25 in medical damages when she
was "only charged for and became liable for $13,577.97 would only
serve to punish the defendants punitively and provide a windfall for the
200. See infra Part IlI.A (discussing the facts of Arthur and the trial court's decision to grant
partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants).
201. See infra Part Ill.B (discussing the majority and dissenting opinions of the appellate
court).
202. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court's majority opinion).
203. See infra Part IlI.C.2 (discussing the dissent authored by Chief Justice McMorrow).
204. Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 849 (Ill. 2005).
205. Id. at 850.
206. Id. Mrs. Arthur was covered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield. Id.
207. Id. The total payments made by Mrs. Arthur were $1,215.74, while Blue Cross paid
$12,362.23. See id. (totaling payments made by Mrs. Arthur and Blue Cross).
208. Id. A total of five health care providers treated Mrs. Arthur, and each had a contractual
agreement with Blue Cross providing for a discount. Id.
209. Id. at 849. Both defendants denied negligence or liability. Id.
210. Id. at 850.
211. Id.
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plaintiff.- 212 The circuit court ruled that the collateral source rule was
not applicable in this situation. 213
B. Appellate Court Decision
After the trial court entered its order for partial summary judgment,
Mrs. Arthur filed an appeal.214 On appeal, Mrs. Arthur argued that the
collateral source rule protects the discounts received by her insurers,
allowing her to seek recovery of the full amount billed.215 Defendants
did not contest that the collateral source rule applied to the amount paid
for Mrs. Arthur's medical services, but did defend the trial court's
decision that the $5,777.28 difference between the amount billed and
amount paid could not be recovered.216 Defendants presented two main
arguments on appeal in defense of the trial court's ruling.217 First, a
plaintiff should not be entitled to recover damages for amounts she was
never liable for-such a recovery would be a windfall. 218 Second, the
difference between the billed amounts and the amount paid is "illusory"
and therefore not subject to the collateral source rule.219
1. The Appellate Court Majority Opinion
The appellate court reversed the circuit court, concluding that Mrs.
Arthur's damages could extend to the entire amount billed and were not
limited to the amount paid by her insurer.220 Defendants argued that the
amount paid to satisfy the obligation was the true amount of damages,
because Mrs. Arthur was never obligated to pay the full amount
billed.221  The court refuted this argument, stating that although
discounting of medical bills has become a common practice in modem
healthcare, it is a consequence of the power wielded by those entities
that pay the bills, such as insurance companies, employers, and
governmental bodies. 222  Although large consumers of healthcare are
212. Id. The circuit court's order echoed language in Peterson. Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt
Chevrolet Co., 392 N.E.2d 1, 5 (111. 1979).
213. Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Ill. 2005).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 851.
216. Id.
217. Arthur v. Catour, 803 N.E.2d 647, 649 (111. App. Ct. 2004).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 651.
221. Id. at 649.
222. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Hayes, 72 F. Supp. 2d 635, 637 (W.D. Va. 1999) and Beard, supra
note 14, at 453). For a discussion of the development of discounts in the health care industry, see
supra Part I.C.1 (describing modem development of the health care industry and the resulting
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able to negotiate favorable rates, people who do not have insurance are
often charged the full, undiscounted price.223  According to the
majority, even though medical bills are often discounted, a plaintiff may
still be liable for the billed amount.224  If a plaintiff does receive
damages greater than the amount paid by her insurer, that amount is a
benefit of her contract with her insurer, not a "windfall" granted by the
defendant.225 The amount billed may be unreasonable, and defendants
may dispute the amount, but it is not unreasonable simply because an
insurance company was able to negotiate a lesser charge. 226
The court then addressed the defendants' second argument, that the
difference between the amount billed and amount paid was
"illusory." 227 The defendants argued that because no one paid or was
liable for the discounted amount, the discounted amount of $5,777.28
was "illusory." 228 The court first provided an overview of the collateral
source rule in Illinois, reiterating the view that damages recovered from
a tortfeasor are not decreased by insurance proceeds received by the
plaintiff.229 Limiting Mrs. Arthur's damages to the amount paid by her
insurer would confer a benefit of her coverage to the defendants. 230 The
court then reiterated the Illinois justification for the collateral source
rule-a defendant should not benefit from the bargains made between a
plaintiff and third parties. 231  But for her insurance coverage, Mrs.
Arthur would have been liable for the full amount charged.232
If a plaintiff's damages were limited to the amount paid by her
insurer, the court would in essence be shifting the benefit of the
insurance contract from Mrs. Arthur to the defendants. 233 The purpose
of the collateral source rule, said the court, is to prevent a defendant
from receiving the benefit of this contractual relationship instead of the
practice of discounting medical bills).
223. Arthur, 803 N.E.2d at 649 (citing B. Hewitt, M. Harrington & C. Clark, Target: Medical
Bills, PEOPLE, Oct. 6, 2003, at 159-60).
224. Id. A plaintiff may not have insurance coverage, in which case the plaintiff would be
liable for the entire billed amount. ld.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 650.
229. Id. at 649 (citing Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 524, 530 (111. 1989)).
230. Id. at 650.
231. Id. at 649-50 (citing Wilson, 546 N.E.2d at 530). "The justification for this rule is that
the wrongdoer should not benefit from the expenditures made by the injured party or take
advantage of contracts or other relations that may exist between the injured party and third
persons." Id.
232. Id. at 650.
233. Id.
The Collateral Source Rule in Illinois
plaintiff.23 4  The $5,777.28 discount was not illusory because Mrs.
Arthur was originally liable for the full amount.235  According to the
appellate court, the discount negotiated by Mrs. Arthur's insurance
company was a benefit of her insurance contract. 236  Under the
collateral source rule, this benefit should inure to the plaintiff, not the
defendant. 237 The court also noted that in many other jurisdictions rules
have been established allowing plaintiffs to recover full payment for
medical expenses, even when the bills were settled for reduced
amounts.
238
The majority dismissed the cases cited by the defendants that hold
medical damages should be limited to the amount actually paid. 239 The
court distinguished these cases because they address payments and
discounts provided by public entities, such as Medicaid and Medicare,
rather than private insurance providers. 240 According to the court, "In
such cases the rationale that plaintiff is being denied the 'benefit of her
bargain' is less compelling" because no payments or obligations were
made by those plaintiffs. 241 The majority concluded by stating that the
decision was not based on the rulings of other courts, but rather the
court's "own judgment of how to best harmonize the law of
compensatory damages with the principles underlying the collateral
source rule."242
The appellate court held that Mrs. Arthur's claim for damages was
not limited to the amount paid by her insurer and could extend to the
entire amount billed, provided those charges were reasonable expenses
234. Id. (citing Wilson, 546 N.E.2d at 530).
235. Id.
236. Id. (citing Acuar v. LeTourneau, 531 S.E.2d 316, 322 (Va. 2000)).
237. Id.
238. Arthur, 803 N.E.2d at 650 (citing Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 2d 279
(D.D.C. 2003); Hardi v. Mezzanotte, 818 A.2d 974 (D.C. 2003); Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 630
N.W.2d 201 (Wis. 2001); Haselden v. Davis, 579 S.E.2d 293 (S.C. 2003); First Midwest Trust
Co. v. Rogers, 701 N.E.2d 1107 (111. App. Ct. 1998)).
239. Arthur, 803 N.E.2d at 650. Defendants provided the following cases in support of their
arguments: Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786 (Pa. 2001) (damages limited to
amount paid by Medicare and supplemental insurance rather than reasonable value of medical
services); McAmis v. Wallace, 980 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Va. 1997) (no recovery for amounts
'written off' pursuant to Medicaid contracts); Bates v. Hogg, 921 P.2d 249 (Kan. 1996) (damages
limited to amounts paid by Medicaid); Hanif v. Housing Auth. of Yolo County, 200 Cal. App. 3d
635 (Ct. App. 1988).
240. Arthur, 803 N.E.2d at 651.
241. Id. (citing Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 392 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1975) (finding
that collateral source rule did not allow plaintiff to recover the value of free medical services
provided by Shriner's Hospital)).
242. Id.
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of necessary medical care.2 43 However, the majority did agree that the
defendants should be permitted to present evidence that the full amount
was not paid.244 The court declined to address how this counterproof
should be presented, claiming this evidentiary matter was beyond the
scope of the certified question. 245
2. Dissenting Opinion to Appellate Court Decision
In a sole dissent, Presiding Justice Holdridge stated that Mrs. Arthur
should be prevented from claiming the discounted amount. 246  Illinois
requires a plaintiff to incur liability in order to recover, and Mrs. Arthur
had never paid or become liable for these charges. 247  Because Mrs.
Arthur never incurred or became liable for the discounted amount,
wrote Justice Holdridge, that amount should not be protected by the
collateral source rule.248
Justice Holdridge also questioned the majority's rationale that the
discount was a benefit of Mrs. Arthur's bargain with her insurance
company.249 The real benefit of the bargain, he argued, was that Mrs.
Arthur's insurer would pay her medical bills, irrespective of what that
amount turned out to be.250 The benefit of the discount belonged to the
insurer, not Mrs. Arthur, and was a result of the insurer's contract with
the medical providers. 251  Mrs. Arthur, argued Justice Holdridge,
received the benefit of her bargain when her insurance provider paid her
medical bills, alleviating her of any liability. 252
C. Illinois Supreme Court-Arthur v. Catour
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision,
holding that a plaintiff may present evidence showing the amount billed,
rather than the amount actually paid, when medical providers provide a
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. Interestingly, the Illinois Supreme Court reached a similar holding-the court agreed
that a defendant could challenge the reasonableness of medical bills-but also refused to address
how such a challenge could properly be made on the grounds that the issue was beyond the scope
of the certified question. Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 854.
246. Arthur, 803 N.E.2d at 651 (Holdridge, P.J., dissenting).
247. Id. (citing Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 392 N.E.2d 1, 5 (III. 1975)). Justice
Holdridge reiterated the Illinois rule that "[m]edical services obtained without expense, obligation
or liability to a plaintiff are not recoverable against a defendant ..... Id.
248. Id. at 652.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
[Vol. 38
The Collateral Source Rule in Illinois
discount.253 After reviewing the collateral source rule in Illinois254 and
the foundational requirements to establish medical damages, 255 the
court adopted the appellate court's conclusion that Mrs. Arthur became
liable when the services were provided and not when they were paid.256
The majority then found the only relevant question in Arthur to be the
determination of the reasonable value of the medical services, since the
certified question merely asked whether certain evidence is admissible
in such cases.257  This Section begins with a presentation of the
majority's analysis in the Arthur case.258 It then reviews the dissenting
opinion by Chief Justice McMorrow. 259
1. Majority Opinion
The majority opinion began with a basic recital of the collateral
source rule as recognized in Illinois. 260 The collateral source rule has
both substantive and evidentiary components, said the court.26 1  The
substantive component of the rule is one of damages, 262 denying the
tortfeasor any corresponding offset or credit for collateral payments
made to or on behalf of the plaintiff.263  Collateral benefits do not
decrease the tortfeasor's liability even though they decrease the
plaintiffs loss.264 Although the rule may sometimes result in a double
recovery for the plaintiff, the law dictates that "a benefit that is directed
to the injured party should not be shifted so as to become a windfall for
the tortfeasor." 265  The Illinois Supreme Court limited the certified
253. Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ill. 2005).
254. Id. at 851-53.
255. Id. at 853-54.
256. Id. at 853.
257. Id. The certified question read: "Whether the Plaintiff who was charged $19,355.25 in
medical bills for medical services related to her injuries can present that amount of bills as
medical expenses in the case or, whether the Plaintiff shall be limited to presenting only
$13,577.97 in medical bills to the jury because that is the amount that was paid by the Plaintiff
and Blue Cross/Blue Shield, who was an insurance carrier for the Plaintiff and who paid the
Plaintiff's medical bills pursuant to insurance contracts at a substantially reduced rate with the
medical providers and which the providers accepted as payment in full." Id. at 849.
258. See infra Part III.C. I (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court's majority opinion).
259. See infra Part lI.C.2 (discussing the dissent authored by Chief Justice McMorrow).
260. Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 851-52 (1ll. 2005).
261. Id. at 852.
262. Id. (quoting J. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 12(a), at 77 (1999)).
263. Id. at 851.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 851-52, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b, at 514 (1979).
This statement is in direct conflict with the Illinois Supreme Court's holding in Peterson. See
supra, Part lI.D.2 (discussing the holding of Peterson).
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question in Arthur to an evidentiary component of the collateral source
rule and not a substantive rule of damages. 266
The evidentiary element of the collateral source rule bars admission
of evidence of the collateral source's existence or the receipt of any
benefits. 267 The concern is that a jury may use the evidence improperly
to deny the plaintiff full recovery of the proper amount of compensatory
damages. 268 Pointing out that a plaintiff was insured can be prejudicial
error in Illinois, since the jury may assume the plaintiff never incurred
any real damages since the insurer paid the medical bills.269 However,
the collateral source rule does not permit a defendant to limit a plaintiff
from introducing evidence establishing the reasonable cost of medical
services that were necessary due to the defendant's negligence. 270 A
defendant must pay the reasonable value of required medical treatment
even when the plaintiff's insurance has paid for the services. 271
Before reaching this "evidentiary component," the court first ruled
that Mrs. Arthur became liable for her medical expenses when the
services were provided, not when the bills were issued.272 Although her
providers billed her insurance company directly, she was still liable, and
there was a possibility her insurance company could have denied
coverage-making Mrs. Arthur liable for the full amount.273  Her
insurance company covered Mrs. Arthur's medical expenses in full, by
paying a portion and having the balance written off pursuant to a
contractual agreement. 274 The court found that the true collateral source
was the insurance company, and not the discount, since Mrs. Arthur did
not individually receive any discounts. 275  Instead, she received the
benefit of her bargain with her insurance company-full coverage for
her medical expenses. 276
266. Id. at 853.
267. Id. at 852.
268. Id. (quoting J. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 12(a), at 77 (1999)).
269. Id. (citing Biehler v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 333 N.E.2d 716 (Il. App.
Ct. 1975); Boden v. Crawford, 552 N.E.2d 1287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)).
270. Id. at 852.
271. Id. at 852-53 (quoting 1 D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.8(1), at 373 (2d ed. 1993)); accord
Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 524, 530 (111. 1989).
272. Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 853.
273. Id. For example, "the policy may have lapsed for nonpayment of premiums, or the
policy may not cover some services, such as cosmetic or reconstructive surgery." Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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The majority then addressed what it labeled as the only relevant
question of the case-the reasonable value of the medical services.
277
Because the certified question "merely asks whether certain evidence is
admissible in such cases," the majority determined that the true issue
only addressed whether the discounted amount may be presented to the
jury.278 The court declined to address whether such discounts were
actually protected by the collateral source rule.279 The court began its
analysis by reviewing the law of damages in Illinois.
280
In Illinois, evidence of medical expenses may be admitted after the
plaintiff shows that (1) she has paid or is liable for the bill, (2) the
expenses were necessary as a result of the defendant's negligence, and
(3) that the charges were reasonable. 281 When a medical bill has been
paid, the bill is prima facie reasonable. 282 If the bill has not been paid,
the plaintiff must establish reasonableness through testimony of a
witness who has knowledge of the services rendered and customary
fees.283  Meeting these admission requirements permits the jury to
decide whether to award none, part, or the entire bill as damages.
284
The Arthur majority's holding confirmed the appellate court's
conclusion that Mrs. Arthur could not make a prima facie case of
reasonableness based on the bills alone, because she could not truthfully
claim that the total billed amount had been paid.285 The bills may be
submitted as evidence, but Mrs. Arthur must establish the
reasonableness of the discounted portions by other means, just as if the
bills were unpaid or the services had not yet been rendered.286 The
court also held that a defendant may challenge the plaintiff's proof on
cross-examination and offer their own evidence contesting the
reasonableness of the medical bills.287 The court did not explain the
methods or evidence parties might use to establish and contest the
reasonableness of discounted medical bills.
288
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. (citing North Chicago Street Ry. Co. v. Cotton, 29 N.E. 899, 902 (I1. 1892) and
Wicks v. Cuneo-Henneberry Co., 150 N.E. 276, 279 (111. 1925)).
282. Id. (citing Flynn v. Cusentino, 375 N.E.2d 433, 436 (111. App. Ct. 1978)).
283. Id. at 853-54.
284. Id. at 854 (citing Baker v. Hutson, 775 N.E.2d 631, 638 (2002)).
285. Id. at 854.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 861-62 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting).
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2. Chief Justice McMorrow's Dissent
In her dissent, Chief Justice McMorrow began by chastising the
majority opinion for failing to answer the true issues presented in the
case, calling the opinion "an answer that amounts to no answer at
all."'289 She defined the majority analytical framework as "unworkable"
and described the holding as "a major change in trial practice," arguing
that the majority opinion compromises the traditional protections of the
collateral source rule and may require a trial within a trial whenever
reasonableness of a plaintiff s medical expenses are at issue.
290
Throughout her dissent, McMorrow reiterated that she was not
expressing an opinion on the final disposition of the issue presented in
the case but rather was basing her dissent solely on the majority's
analysis. 291 According to the Chief Justice, the Arthur case presented a
concrete issue created by two things: (1) the tension between the
principles of compensatory damages and the protections provided to a
plaintiff by the collateral source rule; and (2) the restrictive
interpretation the Illinois Supreme Court previously placed on the
collateral source rule in Peterson.292 In Chief Justice McMorrow's
view, the majority failed to address the true issue-whether a plaintiff
may recover the amount billed or the amount paid for medical
services.293 The majority also completely ignored the Peterson holding
in its analysis, overlooking the prior constraints the Illinois Supreme
Court had placed on the collateral source rule.294 The Peterson case,
according to McMorrow, was especially significant to the Arthur case,
given that the circuit court had cited that case in the order originally
denying Mrs. Arthur's claim for the discounted amounts. 295 By limiting
analysis to the "evidentiary component of the collateral source rule," the
majority crafted the issue so as to avoid discussion of both the Peterson
289. Id. at 856.
290. Id. at 856-57.
291. Id. at 857, 863. Although she wrote that she had no opinion on the ultimate disposition,
Chief Justice McMorrow's dissent reflects many of the same arguments presented in the
defendants' briefs. Id. at 859-63. Similarly, if the chief justice disagreed with the majority's
reasoning but agreed with the ultimate holding, she could have filed a concurrence in the
disposition only. See, e.g., People v. Lander, 831 N.E.2d 596 (111. 2005) (McMorrow, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concurring in the ultimate holding, but dissenting to the
majority's analysis).
292. Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 856. See supra Part I.D (discussing the Peterson holding that the
collateral source rule is inapplicable to gratuitous services).
293. Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 856.
294. Id. at 858-59. (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting). The Peterson decision was not cited in the
majority's opinion. Id.
295. Id. at 859.
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decision and the conflict between the collateral source rule and
compensatory damages. 296
Chief Justice McMorrow began her dissent by noting that a direct
conflict exists between the policy behind compensatory damages and
the principles of the collateral source rule.297 Illinois courts have firmly
established that the purpose of compensatory damages is to compensate
the plaintiff for her injuries, rather than to punish a defendant or provide
the plaintiff a windfall.298 In contrast, the collateral source rule is based
upon the idea that a tortfeasor should not benefit from expenditures or
contracts between the plaintiff and third parties. 299 It is this failure to
reduce the defendant's liability, even though plaintiffs loss has been
reduced, that generates the conflict between the two principles.300
The Illinois Supreme Court addressed this conflict in Peterson and
rejected an absolute version of the collateral source rule.30 1 With the
Peterson decision, Illinois became one of the few jurisdictions to apply
a restricted version of the collateral source rule, excluding gratuities
from the protections of the rule.302 In Arthur, the circuit court had
based its decision on language from Peterson.30 3 More importantly, it
was on this issue that the circuit court certified the question for
appeal.304 By avoiding the real issue presented in Arthur, wrote Chief
Justice McMorrow, the majority had also avoided the issue of whether
296. Id. at 860.
297. Id. at 858 (citing M. POLLELLE & B. OTrILEY, ILLINOIS TORT LAW § 24.13, at 24-39 (3d
ed. 2000) (the collateral source rule "runs counter to the compensatory damage principle of
reimbursement for loss alone")).
298. Id. at 857 (quoting Wilson v. Hoffman Group, 546 N.E.2d 524, 530 (111. 1989) and
stating that "compensatory damages are designed to place [a plaintiff] in a position substantially
equivalent in a pecuniary way to that which [plaintiff] would have occupied had no tort been
committed."). See also Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 179 Ill.2d 367, 406, 689 N.E.2d 1057
(1997) ("There is universal agreement that the compensatory goal of tort law requires that an
injured plaintiff be made whole"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1979).
299. Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 858 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting) (citing Wilson, 546 N.E.2d 524;
Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d 763 (Ill. 1986); 15 ILL. L. & PRAC. Damages § 40 (2000)).
300. Id. at 859.
301. Id. (quoting Muranyi v. Turn Verein Frisch-Auf, 719 N.E.2d 366, 369 (Ill. Ct. App.
1999)). See also M. POLLELLE & B. OTrLEY, ILLINOIS TORT LAW § 24.13 (3d ed. 2000).
302. Id. (citing 2 D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.6(3), at 494 (2d ed.
1993) (recognizing Illinois as one of the few jurisdictions omitting gratuities from the collateral
source rule and noting that in this view "the collateral source rule applies only to benefits the
plaintiff has obtained by purchase or his own efforts"); F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, TORTS
§ 25.9, at 561 n.8 (2d ed. 1986) (listing Illinois as one of a few jurisdictions excluding gratuities
from the collateral source rule)).
303. Id. at 859. The circuit court decision quoted Peterson, stating that "the purpose of
compensatory damages is to compensate a plaintiff and not to punish defendants or bestow a
windfall upon a plaintiff." Id.
304. Id. The certified question is provided at supra note 257.
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to reaffirm Peterson, or overrule that decision and join the majority of
jurisdictions that apply a pure collateral source rule.305  According to
the Chief Justice, if the majority had addressed Peterson and decided to
abandon it and adopt the majority rule, the charged bill would be the
only admissible evidence. 30
6
Chief Justice McMorrow also predicted that the majority opinion will
cause problems in future trials. 30 7  First, she wrote, the majority's
holding as to reasonableness may instigate a trial within a trial.
308
Parties will be required to call witnesses for each health care provider to
testify to the reasonableness of the medical bills, adding time and
expense to the parties, courts, and medical community. 30 9 The second
fault, she added, is that the majority holding appears unworkable. 310
The majority allows defendants to challenge a plaintiffs evidence of
reasonableness, both on cross-examination and by offering its own
proof.311 However, wrote the chief justice, the majority opinion offers
no guidance on how this may be done without jeopardizing other
recognized rules of evidence. 3
12
IV. ANALYSIS
The Arthur holding places Illinois among the majority of states that
have addressed the issue of how discounted medical bills should be
addressed when assessing damages. 313 The Arthur opinion broadens
the reach of the collateral source rule, but the court refused to reconsider
305. Id. at 863.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 856.
308. Id. at 862.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. Chief Justice McMorrow illustrated the impracticability of the majority opinion with
a hypothetical. Justice McMorrow's hypothetical presented the following dilemma: After a
plaintiff has presented testimony establishing her medical bills were reasonable, defense counsel
will likely challenge the witness on cross-examination by asking whether the provider accepted
less than that "reasonable amount" as payment in full. Id. Plaintiffs attorney would then likely
object, arguing that such questioning would reveal that the plaintiffs bills were paid by a
collateral source-insurance. Id. If the plaintiff's objection is sustained, then the Arthur opinion
is irrelevant because defendants have no means of challenging the reasonableness of plaintiffs
medical damages on cross. Id. However, if plaintiffs objection is overruled, the protections of
the collateral source rule will be compromised. Id. The jury would then be presented with
testimony that amount "X" was billed, but amount "Y" was accepted as payment in full; "the jury
may be confused and left to create an explanation"-most likely the existence of insurance. Id.
313. Robinson v. Bates, 828 N.E.2d 657, 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (surveying developing
trends among courts on the issue of whether to allow recovery of medical discounts).
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the basis for recognizing the doctrine in the first place.314 Although the
Illinois Supreme Court adopted the majority rule as to medical
discounts, the court refused to reassess or even discuss the Peterson
decision. 315 Accordingly, Illinois is still one of the few jurisdictions
forbidding recovery when liability has not been incurred. 316 Though the
Arthur opinion addressed the immediate issues of that case, the inherent
conflict between the Arthur and Peterson decisions leaves many issues
unresolved. 317
This Part begins by surveying arguments on both sides of the issue
presented in the Arthur case, and then inspects the analysis provided by
courts outside of Illinois in allowing recovery of medical discounts,
before reaching the conclusion that the majority adopted the better
rule.318 This Part then examines the many unanswered questions and
unresolved conflicts that the Arthur holding failed to address. 319
A. The Illinois Supreme Court Adopted the
Majority Rule in Arthur
In Arthur, the question of fairness revolves around money. The
defense bar argues that allowing recovery of these "phantom damages"
will cause the estimated value of tort cases to increase, hindering
settlements. 320 Attorneys generally consider medical expenses to be the
best indication of jury awards. 321 A rule of thumb commonly used for
calculating pain-and-suffering damages is medical expenses multiplied
by three. 322 Consequently, according to defense attorneys, the danger is
that the higher base amount of these "inflated and fictitious charges"
will be used to demand and obtain extra damage amounts for more
intangible injuries, such as pain and suffering. 323
In response, the plaintiffs' bar argues that allowing evidence of the
amounts initially billed presents a fairer and more realistic picture of a
314. Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 863 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting).
315. Id.
316. Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 392 N.E.2d 1, 5 (111. 1979).
317. See infra Part IV.B.
318. See infra Part V.A.
319. See infra Part IV.B.
320. Beard, supra note 14, at 455.
321. Id.
322. Cal. Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty, 920 F. Supp. 908, 921 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (explaining
how trial attorneys typically assess the value of their cases).
323. Olson, supra note 103, at 178 (citing Smithers v. C & G Custom Module Hauling, 172 F.
Supp. 2d 765, 778 (E.D. Va. 2000), rev'd by Acuar v. Letourneau, 531 S.E.2d 316, 323 (Va.
2000)).
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plaintiff's injuries and damages. 324  Although the difference between
the amounts paid and billed in Arthur was not significant, the difference
in other cases is. 325  In an earlier Illinois case, First Midwest Trust v.
Rogers, the difference was much more drastic.326  In Rogers, roughly
$710,000 in medical expenses was originally billed, but the plaintiffs
HMO negotiated a discount of approximately $377,000.327 Under these
circumstances, if the collateral source rule did not protect the discounted
amounts, the plaintiff would have difficulty establishing that the
reasonable value of the medical services was closer to the higher
amount.328 Without allowing evidence of the discounted amounts, the
collateral source rule would evolve from a shield into a sword-what
once protected plaintiffs could become a weapon used to prevent the
jury from learning the extent of a plaintiff s medical injuries. 329
The Arthur holding places Illinois among the majority on this
issue, 33 and the majority view is the proper application of the collateral
source rule.331 Court decisions not allowing discounts in other jurisdic-
tions were either based on a state statute, misapplied the Restatement, or
were later criticized or narrowed within their own jurisdictions. 332
324. Douglas Rallo, Insurance Write-Offs and the Collateral Source Rule, TRIAL, Sept. 2002,
at 50-51.
325. Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 850. In Arthur the initial bills totaled $19,355.25, but the
providers accepted $13,577.97 as payment in full. Id.
326. First Midwest Trust Co. v. Rogers, 701 N.E.2d 1107 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), overruled on
other grounds by Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314 (111. 2002).
327. Rogers, 701 N.E.2d at 1110, 1117. The decedent in this case was struck by a snow plow,
resulting in brain damage, a ruptured lung, broken left leg and hip, dislocated hip, and right ankle,
spinal, skull, and jaw fractures for which he underwent several surgeries. Id. at 1109-10. He
spent six months in a coma and eventually died. Id.
328. Cal. Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty, 920 F. Supp. 908, 921 (N.D. 111. 1996) (reviewing how
attorneys estimate compensatory damages). See also Chapman v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 7 F.
Supp. 2d 1123 (D. Mont. 1998) (holding that plaintiffs recovery was limited to the amount paid
by Medicaid due to a state statute, but allowing admission of plaintiffs medical bills to show the
jury the severity and extent of her injuries and to establish required future medical care and
expenses).
329. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (1979). Juries use medical bills as a
benchmark when determining the extent of a plaintiffs injuries. See, e.g., Lapidus v. Hahn, 450
N.E.2d 824 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (describing how juries assess compensatory damage awards based
on the incurred expenses, such as medical treatment and lost wages).
330. Robinson v. Bates, 828 N.E.2d 657, 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (surveying developing
trends among courts on the issue of whether to allow recovery of medical discounts).
331. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 920A cmt. b (1979).
332. Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1159 (Haw. 2004) (detailing how most cases that had
refused recovery of medical discounts were later overturned). See also supra Part II.C.2
(describing cases that were later either overturned or limited).
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Nationally, only two jurisdictions have refused to allow recovery of
discounts without a state statute defining the collateral source rule. 333
The Supreme Court of Hawaii argued that both jurisdictions reached
their conclusions after misapplying the Restatement.334  The
Restatement language cited by both courts deals with valuation of
services obtained through fraud or duress, rather than the collateral
source rule.335 Both courts either overlooked or ignored the section of
the Restatement that specifically addresses the collateral source rule.336
Because the Arthur majority applied the proper Restatement rules
addressing the collateral source rule, it is less likely that the holding will
be later overturned or limited.337 According to the Restatement, the
tortfeasor is to compensate for all harm that he causes, rather then just
the injured party's net loss.338  If the Arthur holding becomes overly
burdensome, as the defense bar and insurance industry predict, the state
legislature may always act to limit the collateral source rule. 339
B. Issues the Majority Failed to Address
The Arthur decision leaves many questions and unresolved issues.
First, although the opinion allows for recovery of the discounted
amounts, the court did not address whether Mrs. Arthur's insurer had
333. Hanif v. Housing Auth. of Yolo County, 200 Cal. App. 3d 635, 644 (Ct. App. 1988)
(declining to award plaintiff an amount in excess of the amount actually paid by Medi-Cal);
Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786, 791 (Pa. 2001) (holding that the collateral
source rule did not require that plaintiff recover the amount of the Medicaid write-off since no
one incurred the written-off amount).
334. Magno, 101 P.3d at 1159 (noting that both Hanif and Moorhead erroneously relied upon
Restatement § 911 cmt. h (1977), "which specifically references the reasonable exchange value of
'services tortiously obtained by the defendant's fraud or duress, or for the value of services
rendered in an attempt to mitigate damages"').
335. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 911 cmt. h (1979). "[N]ormally the amount
recovered is the reasonable value of the services rather than the amount paid or charged. If,
however, the injured person paid less than the exchange rate, he can recover no more than the
amount paid, except when the low rate was intended as a gift to him." Id.
336. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 920A cmt. b (1979).
[lI]t is the position of the law that a benefit that is directed to the injured party should
not be shifted so as to become a windfall for the tortfeasor ... [I]f the benefit was a gift
to the plaintiff from a third party or established for him by law, he should not be
deprived of the advantage that it confers ... [o]ne way of stating this conclusion is to
say that it is the tortfeasor's responsibility to compensate for all harm that he causes,
not confined to the net loss that the injured party receives.
Id.
337. Bynum, 101 P.3d at 1159; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (1979).
338. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (1979).
339. Branton, supra note 71, at 889 (describing efforts in some states to limit the collateral
source rule through legislative barriers).
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
the right to enforce a lien over that discounted amount.340  This is an
important issue, as Illinois appellate courts currently disagree over such
rights of subrogation. 341 Second, the majority's failure to address the
Peterson opinion raises many questions, such as possible limitations on
recoveries by lower-income plaintiffs receiving medical coverage
through government social programs. 342
Although the Illinois Supreme Court had earlier rejected the concept
of awarding windfalls to plaintiffs, the Arthur holding creates such a
windfall, and awards it to the plaintiff.343 As presented earlier, in most
instances the collateral source rule does not result in double recoveries
because of the insurer's subrogation interest.344  However, there is
currently a split among Illinois appellate courts as to whether a lien-
holder may collect the amount originally billed, in the event the plaintiff
later recovers the higher amount. 345 If the insurer's subrogation interest
is protected, the insurer would later recoup both the amount of the
discount as well as the dollar amount actually paid for the medical
bills.346
The Arthur majority could have resolved this circuit split and allowed
the insurer to recover the amount recovered by the plaintiff. Such a
holding would have allowed subrogation to eliminate the "windfall,"
reflecting the policies inherent in the Peterson decision.3 47  Although
addressing subrogation could have prevented such windfalls, the
majority's decision to allow recovery of the discounted amounts appears
to be the fairest approach.
The majority's silence regarding the Peterson holding is also
important because the collateral source rule in most jurisdictions
protects gifts and gratuitous services. 348 Many of the foreign opinions
protecting the plaintiff's ability to recover for the billed amount,
particularly in cases involving Medicaid and Medicare, are based on the
340. Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 854 (111. 2005).
341. Lopez v. Morley, 817 N.E.2d 592 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Rogalla v. Christie Clinic, P.C.,
794 N.E.2d 384, 392-93 (111. App. Ct. 2003).
342. Robinson v. Bates, 828 N.E.2d 657, 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
343. See supra Part II.D.2 (discussing the Peterson case).
344. Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 630 N.W.2d 201, 210 (Wis. 2001) (explaining principles of
subrogation).
345. Compare Lopez, 817 N.E.2d at 599 and N.C. v. AW., 713 N.E.2d 775, 776 (I1. App. Ct.
1999) (holding that a medical provider may not place a lien on the discounted amount) with
Rogalla, 794 N.E.2d at 392-93 (holding a lien may be placed on the discounted amount).
346. Koffman, 630 N.W.2d at210-11.
347. Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 392 N.E.2d 1, 5 (El. 1979).
348. Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 863 (I. 2005) (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting).
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collateral source rule's protection of gifts.349  The South Carolina
Supreme Court, for example, stated that "[r]ecovery does not depend on
whether there is any bill at all, and the tortfeasor is liable for the value
of medical services even if they are given without charge, since it is
their value and not their cost that counts." 350 The Hawaii Supreme
Court wrote that medical discounts could be viewed conceptually as
gratuitous services, placing them within the protections of the collateral
source rule.351 However, in Arthur Illinois has again aligned itself with
those other courts that have justified the collateral source rule's
protection of medical discounts on a contractual basis. 352
The Arthur majority's dependence on the contractual element, a
holdover from Peterson, may in the future preclude recovery of the
billed amounts by plaintiffs covered by Medicare or Medicaid. 353 Just
like the plaintiff in Peterson, those covered by Medicaid and Medicare
do not make any "expenditures" for their coverage, so it is foreseeable
that a future court may prevent recovery for these "services obtained
without expense, obligation or liability." 354  Some foreign courts have
rejected claims by public-aid recipients because there is no "benefit of
the bargain" to protect, since the premiums are paid by the taxpayers
rather than the plaintiff.355 By overruling or clarifying Peterson, the
Arthur majority could have prevented this situation from arising in the
future.
349. Robinson v. Bates, 828 N.E.2d 657, 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
350. Haselden v. Davis, 579 S.E.2d 293, 295 (S.C. 2003) (citing DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF REMEDIES, § 8.1, at 543 (1973)).
351. Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1156 (Haw. 2004).
352. Acuar v. Letourneau, 531 S.E.2d 316, 323 (Va. 2000); Hardi v. Mezzanotte, 818 A.2d
974, 984 (D.C. 2003).
353. See Coop. Leasing v. Johnson, 872 So. 2d 956, 960 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
that pursuant to state statute Medicare benefits are not a collateral source and not recoverable
because the plaintiff never became liable and the federal government has no right to
reimbursement); Dyet v. McKinley, 81 P.3d 1236, 1239 (Idaho 2003) (holding that a plaintiff
may not recover for Medicare write-offs). Cf, Haselden, 579 S.E.2d at 294 (holding that "the
collateral source rule applies to Medicaid payments"); Brandon HvIA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So.
2d 611, 619 (Miss. 2001) (holding "that Medicaid payments are subject to the collateral source
rule"); Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 611 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Wis. 2000) (applying the collateral source
rule to medical expenses paid directly by Medicaid); Cates v. Wilson, 361 S.E.2d 734, 738 (N.C.
1987) (explaining that Medicaid is "social legislation; it is the equivalent of health insurance for
the needy" and "is an acceptable collateral source"); Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp.
Co., 201 N.W.2d 745, 752 (Wis. 1972) (holding that the collateral source rule applies to Medicare
and "is not limited to paid-for benefits but applies to gratuitous medical services provided or paid
for by the state"). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. c (1979) (explaining
that "social legislation benefits" are subject to the collateral source rule).
354. Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 392 N.E.2d 1, 5 (111. 1979).
355. Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786, 790 (Pa. 2001).
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V. IMPACT
Although Chief Justice McMorrow's dissent raised concerns
regarding the Arthur majority's opinion, courts in Virginia and South
Carolina have resolved similar dilemmas. 356 This Part begins with a
discussion of McMorrow's questions and how similar issues have been
addressed in other jurisdictions. 357 Illinois will most likely adopt the
methods and means utilized by those courts when defendants challenge
the reasonableness of discounted medical bills.358
A. Change in Trial Practice
Chief Justice McMorrow predicted that the Arthur decision will
change trial practice in Illinois. 359 The holding alters the rule that paid
bills are prima facie reasonable and encourages defendants to challenge
a plaintiff's evidence of reasonableness through the use of cross-
examination and counterproof. 360  Because the majority did not
specifically address how a defendant may properly contest the
reasonableness, this may be an area ripe for abuse and conflicting
opinions. 361
1. Examples from Virginia and South Carolina
Shortly after the supreme courts of Virginia and South Carolina
presented holdings akin to Arthur (permitting recovery of medical
discounts), cases quickly followed addressing the practice of those
opinions. 362  Both suits specifically address one of Chief Justice
McMorrow's concerns: the use of the discounted amount by a defendant
to contest reasonableness of medical bills. 363 Both Virginia and South
Carolina agreed that a defendant may not present the amount actually
paid as counterproof. 3
64
356. See infra Part V.A.1 (discussing court decisions from Virginia and South Carolina
addressing the attempted evidentiary use of discounted medical bills by defendants in order to
show unreasonableness of the originally billed amounts).
357. Id.
358. See infra Part V.A.2 (predicting Illinois's adoption of the Virginia and South Carolina
holdings).
359. Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 856 (Ill. 2005) (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting).
360. Id. at 854 (majority opinion).
361. Id. at 863 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting).
362. Radvany v. Davis, 551 S.E.2d 347 (Va. 2001); Covington v. George, 597 S.E.2d 142
(S.C. 2004).
363. Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 863 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting); Radvany, 551 S.E.2d at 348;
Covington, 597 S.E.2d at 143.
364. Radvany, 551 S.E.2d at 348; Covington, 597 S.E.2d at 143.
The Collateral Source Rule in Illinois
In Acuar v. Letourneau, the Virginia Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff could present the amount originally billed for medical services,
rather than just the amount actually paid.365 Soon after that decision,
another Virginia case arose addressing the evidentiary effect of the
holding. 366  In Radvany v. Davis, defense counsel attempted to
introduce the amount accepted as payment in full by plaintiffs medical
provider, as counterproof of reasonableness. 367 The defense attorney
argued Acuar only established that a plaintiff could recover for amounts
discounted by his medical providers, and did not address whether the
discounted amounts could be presented by a defendant as evidence of
the reasonable value of the services. 368  This is exactly the same
argument predicted and presented in Chief Justice McMorrow's
hypothetical. 369
The Virginia Supreme Court used the argument presented in Radvany
to reemphasize that Acuar found the discounted amounts to be part of
the plaintiffs contractual benefit. 370  The negotiated discounts were
agreed upon pursuant to contractual obligations and "do not reflect the
prevailing cost' of those services to other patients." 371  Thus,
defendants in Virginia may not present evidence showing that a lesser
amount was accepted as payment in full. 372  The court stated that
however they may be labeled, the payments made and amounts accepted
are "one and the same" and are not admissible because of the collateral
source rule.373
In South Carolina, the state supreme court held that plaintiffs could
recover medical discounts as part of a damages claim. 374 Within a year,
the defendant in Covington v. George proposed testimony from the
manager of medical records from one of the plaintiff's providers,
revealing that $276.86 was accepted as payment in full for a charged
bill of $1,430.00.375 The trial court refused the evidence of the partial
365. Acuar v. Letourneau, 531 S.E.2d 316, 323 (Va. 2000).
366. Radvany, 551 S.E.2d at 348.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 863 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting).
370. Radvany, 551 S.E.2d at 348 (writing that medical discounts are "as much of a benefit for
which [the plaintiff] paid consideration as are the actual cash payments made by his health
insurance carrier to the health care providers" (citing Acuar, 531 S.E.2d at 322)).
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Haselden v. Davis, 579 S.E.2d 293, 294 (S.C. 2003).
375. Covington v. George, 597 S.E.2d 142, 143 (S.C. 2004).
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payment and discount.376  The Covington defendant argued the prior
decision permitted a defendant to introduce evidence that a provider had
accepted a discounted amount as payment in full, so that the defendant
could establish the reasonable value of services. 377 The defendant
argued the prior decision permitted him to dispute reasonableness by
introducing testimony of the reduced payment. 378  The court rejected
these arguments. 37
9
The Covington court explained that allowing a defendant to present
evidence of the discounted payments would confuse a jury, and any
attempts by the plaintiff to explain the discount would lead to the
existence of insurance, the collateral source. 380 The evidentiary limits
established by the Virginia and South Carolina courts appear to be the
initial foundation of a growing majority rule, as a Georgia court has also
ruled that defendants may not contest reasonableness of medical bills by
presenting evidence that a discounted amount was accepted as payment
in full. 381
2. The Likely Outcome in Illinois
While Chief Justice McMorrow's concerns about the Arthur
holding's impact on future trials in Illinois are legitimate, it is likely
Illinois courts will reach the same conclusions as the courts in Virginia
and South Carolina. 382  Defendants will be allowed to contest the
reasonableness of medical charges, but they will be restricted from
presenting evidence showing that a discounted amount was accepted as
payment in full. 383 Instead, defendants will have to use other methods,
such as presenting witnesses familiar with medical billing in the
relevant community. 384  This likely outcome is most consistent with
current Illinois trial practice. 385
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Covington, 597 S.E.2d at 145 ("While a defendant is permitted to attack the necessity
and reasonableness of medical care and costs, he cannot do so using evidence of payments made
by a collateral source.").
381. Olariu v. Marrero, 549 S.E.2d 121, 123 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
382. Radvany v. Davis, 551 S.E.2d 347, 348 (Va. 2001); Covington, 597 S.E.2d at 144.
383. See Covington, 597 S.E.2d at 144 (establishing a rule where reasonableness of medical
bills may be contested through witness testimony, but not by introducing into evidence the
amount accepted as payment in full).
384. See Victory Mem'l Hosp. v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d 117, 119 (111. App. Ct. 1986) (explaining
that a witness must testify that they are "familiar with the usual and customary charges for the
services rendered to the patient and that the charges were reasonable").
385. Id. It follows that a witness will also be required to argue that any bills are unreasonable.
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The Collateral Source Rule in Illinois
According to the Arthur majority, a plaintiff wishing to claim the
amount originally billed will be required to present a witness to
establish that the bills were reasonable. 386 This is because the bills were
not paid in full, so the original billed amount does not meet the prima
facie rule.387 Hence, a plaintiff who receives discounts on her medical
bills must decide whether to present at trial either the amount billed or
the amount paid as a measure of her damages. 388 If the plaintiff opts to
present only the amount actually paid, her bills are prima facie
reasonable, and she will not need witness testimony to admit the
bills.389 However, if a plaintiff desires to pursue recovery for the
amount initially billed, she will need to retain a witness to testify to the
reasonableness of those initial charges. 390 If the plaintiff decides to
present evidence establishing that this higher, initial charge is
reasonable, the defense will have an opportunity to rebut that testimony,
either through cross-examination or rebuttal witnesses.
391
VI. CONCLUSION
The majority holding of Arthur v. Catour may be both criticized and
commended. Because Illinois is one of the few states that has placed
judicial restraints on the collateral source rule, it was quite possible for
the court to reject Mrs. Arthur's arguments and forbid her from
presenting evidence of the higher, originally billed amount. By
allowing plaintiffs to present claims for the billed amount rather than
limiting suits to the amount actually paid, Illinois has followed the
majority rule and adopted the method that presents the clearest picture
for the jury. However, by ignoring the conflicts remaining from
Peterson and refusing to review opinions from foreign jurisdictions, the
Arthur holding leaves questions and conflicts that the Illinois Supreme
Court will most likely be forced to decide in the future.
See supra Part V.A. I (describing the rules adopted in Virginia and South Carolina).
386. Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ill, 2005).
387. Id.
388. Id. See also Cal. Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins., 920 F. Supp. 908, 921 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (reviewing juries' measurement of compensatory damages based on amount of special
damages presented as evidence).
389. Wicks v. Cuneo-Henneberry Co., 150 N.E. 276, 278 (Ill. 1925) (stating the Illinois rule
that payment of a medical bill is prima facie evidence that the amount paid is reasonable).
390. Arthur, 833 N.E.2d at 854.
391. Covington v. George, 597 S.E.2d 142, 144 (S.C. 2004).
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